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INTRODUCTION
The failure of the international community to intervene in Afghanistan
prior to September 11 th was more than a failure of politics. It was also a
failure of law. To put it bluntly, human rights law has a problem with
religion. In a postmodern world in which the nation-state has been
deconstructed and eighteenth- and nineteenth-century notions of
unmediated national sovereignty have been properly put to rest, religion-
and its attendant category, culture-represent the New Sovereignty.
1
Human rights abuses that since World War II are no longer acceptable
when committed by states2 are paradoxically tolerated when justified in the
name of religion or culture. September 11 th crystallized this fact. The
infamous Taliban regime in Afghanistan assumed power in 1996 and
immediately began stripping women of fundamental human rights3 to
1. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
445 (2d ed. 2000) ("If notions of state sovereignty represent one powerful concept and a force that
challenges and seeks to limit the reach of the international human rights movement, religion can
then represent another."); David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History
of an Illusion, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 99, 101 (1997) (describing the historical movement in
international law "from autonomy to community," and expressing concern that "there remain
those (often in politics, or in the third world, or new to the field) who would return us to a time of
sovereignty"). My use of the word sovereignty refers to its traditional sense as the right to be let
alone-what's new are the parties making these claims. Cf ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS (1995). In the words of Anne-Marie Slaughter (writing in her memorial to Abe
Chayes), Chayes and Chayes offer an evolving sense of the term in which "sovereignty no longer
means the right to be left alone, but rather the right and capacity to participate 'in the regimes that
make up the substance of international life."' Anne-Marie Slaughter, In Memoriam, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 682, 684-85 (2001) (quoting CHAYES & CHAYES, supra, at 27).
2. It is easy to forget that individual rights are of only recent vintage in international law. As
Louis Henkin reminds us:
[F]or hundreds of years international law and the law governing individual life did not
come together. International law, true to its name, was law only between States,
governing only relations between States on the State level. What a State did inside its
borders in relation to its own nationals remained its own affair, an element of its
autonomy, a matter of its "domestic jurisdiction."
LOUIS HENKN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS, VALUES AND FUNCTIONS 209 (1989). But as a
general matter, human rights law is just one example of the gradual whittling away of traditional
notions of state sovereignty. See Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005,
1039 (2001) ("While it is true ... that there was never an era in which nation-states had absolute
dominion over their territory, the last century saw a higher degree of legalization of intrusions into
territorial sovereignty, as well as a magnification of the number and breadth of such intrusions.").
3. Implementing the "strictest interpretation of Shari'a law ever seen in the Muslim world,"
the Taliban closed down girls' schools and banned women from working outside the home,
smashed TV sets, forbade a whole array of sports and recreational activities, and ordered all males
to grow long beards. AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL AND FUNDAMENTALISM
IN CENTRAL ASIA 29, 50-51 (2000). A strict dress code was imposed on women, which required
them to wear head-to-toe veils, id. at 50, and people were required to blacken the windows of their
homes so women could not be seen from the street, id. at 70. Women were banned from general
hospitals, id. at 7 1, and their health suffered dramatically, see Physicians for Human Rights, The
Taliban's War on Women-a Health and Human Rights Crisis in Afghanistan, at
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education,4 healthcare,5 work,6 and movement. But war, not law, defeated
what has been described as the world's most ruthless fundamentalist
regime. For all its pomp and circumstance, international human rights had
little to do with it.
8
Current scholarship posits an inherent conflict between women's rights
and culture. 9 But this Article argues that religion qua religion is less the
problem than is our traditional legal construction of this category. Premised
on a centuries-old, Enlightenment compromise that justified reason in the
public sphere by allowing deference to religious despotism in the private,
human rights law continues to define religion in the twenty-first century as
a sovereign, extralegal jurisdiction in which inequality is not only accepted,
but expected. Law views religion as natural, irrational, incontestable, and
imposed-in contrast to the public sphere, the only viable space for
freedom and reason. Simply put, religion is the "other" of international law.
Today, fundamentalists are taking advantage of this legal tradition.
10
Yet, contrary to law's centuries-old conception, religious communities are
http://www.phrusa.org/researchhealtheffects/exec.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2003). For the texts
of Taliban decrees, see Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, U.N.
ESCOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/59 (1997).
4. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, art. 10, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 18 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter Women's
Convention]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.
13, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 8 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 26, G.A. Res. 217
(Ill)A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration
of Human Rights]. See generally Convention Against Discrimination in Education, May 22, 1962,
429 U.N.T.S. 93.
5. See Women's Convention, supra note 4, arts. 12, 14, at 19-20; Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 4, art. 12, at 8; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
supra note 4, art. 25(l).
6. See Women's Convention, supra note 4, art. 11, at 18-19; Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, supra note 4, arts. 7, 8, at 6-7; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra
note 4, art. 23.
7. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, art. 20(2),
S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23 (1978), 999 UN.T.S. 171, 178 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 4, art. 13.
8. While the Bush Administration did cite the Taliban's mistreatment of women in its
denunciation of the regime, American intervention was motivated principally by the desire to
reduce the threat of terrorism from al Qaeda by destroying the group's sanctuary. Given the U.S.
government's prior indifference, the invocation of the plight of women seems more cynical than
sincere.
9. See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in Is
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that
multiculturalism is not in the best interests of women and children).
10. See Christina M. Cema & Jennifer C. Wallace, Women and Culture, in I WOMEN AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 623, 646 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds.,
1999) ("States have used this distinction [between public and private] to the disadvantage of
women by asserting that certain harmful practices are cultural traditions, and thus outside of the
realm of human rights law."); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Cultural Particularism as a Bar to Women's
Rights: Reflections on the Middle Eastern Experience, WLUML DOSSIER 16, Nov. 1996, at 21,
26 ("Middle Eastern governments [can exploit] Western stereotypes of Islam.").
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internally contested, heterogeneous, and constantly evolving over time
through internal debate and interaction with outsiders." And this has never
been so true as in the twenty-first century. Individuals in the modern world
increasingly demand change within their religious communities in order to
bring their faith in line with democratic norms and practices.' 2 Call this the
New Enlightenment: Today, individuals seek reason, equality, and liberty
not just in the public sphere, but also in the private spheres of religion,
culture, and family.' 3 Current law, however, elides these claims for
modernization. Failing to recognize cultural and religious communities as
contested and subject to change, legal norms such as the "freedom of
religion," the "right to culture," and the guarantee of "self-determination"
defer to the claims of patriarchal, religious elites, buttressing their power
over the claims of modernizers. Paradoxically, law's failure to question or
revisit its old Enlightenment views is obstructing the emergence of the New
Enlightenment. In short, human rights law, not religion, is the problem. 
14
But on the ground, women's human rights activists are piercing the veil
of religious sovereignty. Betraying a growing disconnect between human
rights law and human rights practice, this Article presents a close study of
women's human rights activists working in Muslim communities and
countries. It demonstrates that, despite law's formal refusal to acknowledge
claims of internal dissent, women are nonetheless claiming their rights to
challenge religious and cultural authorities and to imagine religious
community on more egalitarian and democratic terms. Just as we "pierce
the veil" of corporate sovereignty in cases of injustice or fraud,15 women
11. See, e.g., MICHAEL M.J. FISCHER & MEHDI ABEDI, DEBATING MUSLIMS: CULTURAL
DIALOGUES IN POSTMODERNITY AND TRADITION (1990) (highlighting internal plurality and
contest among Muslims).
12. See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, WHY I AM A CATHOLIC 3 (2002) (posing the question: "How
does one remain a Catholic while criticizing some of the church's authority figures?"). Wills
describes three reactions to his earlier book, Papal Sin, which criticized the Church. The first
group asked him how he could reconcile his faith with his criticism of the Church. "The second
asked why I did not leave." Id. at 4. The third group-the secularists-"thought I was right to
criticize dishonesty in church leaders but wrong to expect anything else." Id. at 5. Wills says he
wrote Why I Am a Catholic for the first group "against the charges of the second and third
groups." Id. at 6.
13. See, e.g., FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD REPORT 14 (Kevin Boyle &
Juliet Sheen eds., 1997) (discussing the recurring theme of women's and gay rights within
religious communities around the world, writing that one might see these campaigns "as part of a
larger debate about democracy within religious communities, movements, and churches"); see
also discussion infra Section I.D, Part III.
14. Cf Cema & Wallace, supra note 10, at 646 (arguing that "[]legal systems based on
traditional liberal philosophy" make it difficult to stop harmful discrimination against women);
David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 101 (2002) ("The legal regime of 'human rights,' taken as a whole, does more to
produce and excuse violations than to prevent and remedy them.").
15. This Article uses the metaphor of "piercing the veil" in the context of human rights law
and does not address the doctrine as it relates to corporate law. On piercing the veil in corporation
law generally, see STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 151-90
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activists are asserting a right to confront oppressive laws and practices
otherwise legally shielded in the name of religion.
Scholars have failed to recognize the full significance of these efforts.
By insisting, in the words of President George W. Bush, "if you're not with
us, you're against US,' 16 scholars celebrate campaigns for women's rights in
Muslim communities for their similarities to Western women's rights
movements, but elide what is different in these claims.17 In fact, these
campaigns present powerful critiques of current law, which offers women a
right to religious freedom (on leaders' terms) or to equality (within the
public sphere), but no right to both. Envisioning a third way, women human
rights activists in Muslim communities are pursuing equality and freedom
within the context of religion, not just without it.
We ignore these activists at our peril. In an era of rising
fundamentalism in which women's-and men's-lives are increasingly
governed by private, not public, laws,' 8 securing human rights requires
deconstructing religion and culture. As the anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod
writes, "We have become politicized about race and class, but not
culture."' 19 The same can be said-perhaps more forcefully-about
religion,20 which law's Enlightenment origins have encouraged us to fear
and to worship. Unmasking the politics and mutability of religion that
traditional legal narratives have concealed, we must identify that part of
religion that is a human or legal construction and thus requires justification
and accountability. 21 As Kahled Abou El Fadl asks, "In Islamic thought,
God is the authoritative source of law, but what is the balance between
God's authoritativeness and the potential for human authoritarianism?,
22
(2002); ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 37, 71-85 (1986); and Robert B. Thompson,
Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991).
16. Arundhati Roy, The Algebra of Infinite Justice, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 29, 2001,
Saturday Review, at 1 (arguing that Bush's ultimatum is "not a choice that people want to, need
to, or should have to make").
17. See discussion infra Section [V.A.
18. Here I refer to formal and informal laws, including custom and tradition.
19. See Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological
Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others, 104 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 783, 789 (2002).
20. See, e.g., Diana L. Eck, The Multireligious Public Square, in ONE NATION UNDER GOD?
RELIGION AND AMERICAN CULTURE 3 (Marjorie Garber & Rebecca L. Walkowitz eds., 1999); id.
at 5 (remarking on "academic blindspots when it comes to religion"). Eck writes that "[tiaking
religion seriously as a category of analysis" means abandoning the "Ifighly reified thing-ish notion
of religion as if 'it' were a bounded set of ideas, institutions, and practices." Id. Far from it, Eck
describes "religious traditions such as Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam" as "dynamic, more like
rivers than structures, constantly negotiating the terms and directions of change." Id.
21. I do not attempt to offer a study in Islamic law in this Article, but rather, focus solely on
legal constructions of religion. For introductions to Islam and Islamic legal systems, see KARLED
ABOU EL FADL, SPEAKING IN GOD'S NAME: ISLAMIC LAW, AUTHORITY AND WOMEN (2001);
KAREN ARMSTRONG, ISLAM: A SHORT HISTORY (2000); DAVID PEARL, A TEXTBOOK ON
MUSLIM LAW (1979); and LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE JUSTICE OF ISLAM: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY (2000).
22. KAHLED ABOU EL FADL, REBELLION AND VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC LAW 1 (2001).
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This is nothing less than a question of life or death. In Pakistan last
summer, a mentally disturbed young man was stoned to death for alleged
blasphemy, and a tribal council ordered that a young woman be raped as
revenge for a crime allegedly committed by her brother-all on the basis of
traditional Islamic Shari'a law.23 In Nigeria, another woman, Amina Lawal,
awaits her fate after an appeals court in that country upheld a Shari'a
court's ruling that Lawal be stoned to death because she gave birth to a
child outside of marriage. 24 Nigeria's Supreme Court may ultimately decide
the case. But as it currently stands, there is no legal theory-either under
Nigerian national law or international human rights law-for overturning
the pronouncements of a religious court.
25
In such cases, law's conception of religion and culture matters. So long
as law continues to hold a fundamentalist view of religion and culture, it
will transfer more power to fundamentalists and traditionalists at the
expense of human rights. This Article is an effort to intervene in this
process.26 I lay the groundwork for my argument in Part I, describing the
New Sovereignty and the New Enlightenment as parallel movements.
Paradoxically, just as claims to absolute religious authority are becoming
weaker in the modem world, calls for law to protect or preserve religious
23. See Beena Sarwar, Brutality Cloaked as Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2002, at A15. As
Pakistani journalist Beena Sarwar wrote in the New York Times, the tribal court pronouncement
reflects an increased willingness on the part of the state to authorize local authoritarian rulers-in
the name of deferring to customary, religious, or traditional laws-to govern the lives of citizens.
Aside from noting the dubious "religious" or "traditional" basis of these new laws, Sarwar finds
"equally troubling ... that the state, in its insecurity, might even cede more power by redefining
public affairs as private, thereby shifting accountability away from itself and into the hands of
others." Id.
24. The sentence has been commuted until after Lawal has finished weaning her less than
one-year-old baby. See Simon Robinson, Casting Stones; The Koran Says Nothing About Stoning.
Why Is This Mother Facing Death?, TIME, Sept. 2, 2002, at 36; Camillus Eboh, Mother Must Be
Stoned To Death, Rules Nigerian Court, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 20, 2002, at 12. On death
by stoning in the Muslim world, see generally H.R. Con. Res. 351, 107th Cong. (2002)
(expressing "the sense of the Congress that the United States should condemn the practice of
execution by stoning," and discussing State Department documentation of executions by stoning
in Nigeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen).
25. Although Nigerian government officials-including President Olusegun Obasanjo-have
made statements to the international press that they will not tolerate a stoning under Shari'a law,
they have made conflicting statements within Nigeria about the importance of Shari'a law and its
long established acceptance in the Nigerian constitution. See, e.g., Tokunbo Adedoja & Abimbola
Akosile, Anti Miss World Protests, THIS DAY, Nov. 26, 2002, at http://allafrica.com/stories/
printable/200211260367.html (reporting President Obasanjo's statements that "Shari'a law has
always been part of our law" and that "Shari'a is not a new thing in our constitution"); Nigeria
Vows To Block Islamic Court's Executions by Stoning, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Nov. 10, 2002,
1110/02 DJINS 02:49:00 (Westlaw); Press Release, Amnesty International, Nigeria: Amina
Lawal-the Nigerian Government's Double Speech, at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/
AFR440222002 (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
26. The issue is of utmost importance today in countries such as India, Mali, the Philippines,
and South Africa, where authorities are debating reforms to their personal and/or customary laws.
The question is whether women's and other modernizers' views of what constitutes religion and
tradition will be heard, or whether lawmakers will simply defer to patriarchal leaders. See
discussion infra Section II.D.
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authority against claims for change and modernity are becoming more
pronounced. Taking advantage of the legal tradition of deference to
religion, contemporary fundamentalists are using law to buttress
authoritarian and patriarchal claims against the challenges of the New
Enlightenment. As this Part shows, whether and how we pierce the veil of
the New Sovereignty will have profound consequences for the future of the
New Enlightenment emerging on the ground.
In Part II, I revisit the traditional intellectual history of international law
in order to better understand how law's construction of religion as law's
"other" obstructs new constructions of religion as compatible with rights. I
argue that our entrenched narrative of international law as in transition
away from the premodern world of religion toward a modem world of
secular rights makes no accommodation for the presence of religion, or
modem claims for both religion and rights. The result is that, in case after
case in both international and national law, law is siding with
fundamentalists over modernizers within religious and cultural
communities.
Part III turns to the work of the transnational information-sharing and
solidarity network, Women Living Under Muslim Laws, and the
unexamined archives of women's human rights education manuals, to
demonstrate how, on the ground, women activists in the Muslim world are
defying the transition narrative and confronting fundamentalist and legal
constructions of religion here and now. Rather than accepting the binary
framework of religion (on traditional leaders' terms) or rights (without
normative community), activists are developing strategies and new human
rights theory that enable women to claim freedom and equality within the
context of normative community. Based on close readings of nontraditional
sources of international law-illuminated by interviews with leading
activists from around the globe-I begin to identify in the work of these
activists the rumblings of the New Enlightenment, and a conceptually
coherent framework for operationalizing modernity within the context of
culture and community. In the final Part, I suggest how law, in harnessing
these bottom-up strategies and theories, may pierce the veil of the New
Sovereignty and operationalize the New Enlightenment.
A note before proceeding. Some may object to my titling an article
about women in the Muslim world "Piercing the Veil. ' 7 Nevertheless, I use
27. Particularly after September 1 Ith, such a title could be characterized as everything from
trite o offensive. Indeed, by now the veil trope may seem exhausted. See, e.g., Jen'nan Ghazal
Read & John P. Bartowski, To Veil or Not To Veil, 14 GENDER & SoC'Y 395 (2000); Nicole
Gaouette et al., Voices from Behind the Veil, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 19, 2001, at 1;
Marilyn Gardner, Lifting the Veil on Women's Subjugation, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 28,
2001, at 15; Donna Gehrke-White, Behind the Veil, a Strength of Fauih, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 24,
2001, at 1E; L.S. Klepp, Under the Veil, ENT. WKLY., Oct. 26, 2001, at 112; Stanley Kurtz, Veil
of Fears: Why the Veil, NAT'L REV., Jan. 28, 2002, at 36; Richard Lacayo, About Face, TIME,
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this title as a legal term of art. Simply put, no legal phrase highlights better
the ultimate argument of this Article: that in many ways, religion, like the
corporation, is a construction of law. At its most basic level, this legal
doctrine reminds us that law should intervene, even when deference is
otherwise the rule, when grave injustice is at hand. But at a deeper level-
and this is my concern-"piercing the veil" reveals that far from existing in
the world as a natural, discrete category with an inherent essence, religion is
in part constructed by legal narrative, theory, and doctrine. Indeed, in
today's increasingly fragmented world, more and more it is law-and not
religion itself-that determines the boundaries of religious jurisdiction and
the amount of autonomy and equality that are possible within the religious
sphere. Thus far, law has used its power to authorize fundamentalist control
over women and individuals, forcefully helping to preserve tradition against
modernity. "Piercing the Veil," then, is both a description and a
prescription. Law must both recognize and confront the veil of religious
sovereignty.
I. GROUNDWORK
A. The New Sovereignty
Today we are witnessing the rise of religion and culture as the New
Sovereignty at the very moment that we are hearing rumblings on the
ground of a New Enlightenment. While religious sovereignty is not new,
the conflict between religion and culture and the global recognition that
"women's rights are human rights" is growing.28 Unlike other rights,29
Dcc. 3, 2001, at 34 (using the title "Lifting the Veil" on the magazine's cover); Pete Norman &
Eileen Finan, Veil of Tears, PEOPLE, Nov. 12, 2001, at 106; Atefeh Oliai, From Behind the Veil,
FEMINIST VOICES, Nov. 2, 1997, at 7; Sean Salai, Veiled Messages, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002,
at A2; CNN Presents: Beneath the Veil (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 26, 2001).
28. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks for the United Nations Fourth World Conference on
Women (Sept. 8, 1995), at gopher://gophcr.undp.org:70/OO/unconfs/womenlconf/gov/
950905175653 (proclaiming the mantra of the conference: "If there is one message that echoes
forth from this conference, it is that human rights are women's rights.... And women's rights are
human rights."). Women at the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women held in
Beijing in 1995 popularized this phrase, but women's rights were first recognized as officially
human rights during the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993. See Vienna
Declaration and Programme ofAction, pt. 1, 11, U.N. Doe. AICONF.157/23 (1993).
29. See Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty
and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis Under the United Nations Charter, 35 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 271 (1997) (comparing the refusal to accept religious or cultural justifications for
racial apartheid to the easy acceptance of such claims in the case of women's rights); Ann
Elizabeth Mayer, A "Benign" Apartheid: How Gender Apartheid Has Been Rationalized, 5
UCLA J. INT'L L. & AFF. 237 (2001) (juxtaposing the treatment of racial and gender apartheid in
international human rights law).
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women's human rights are being consistently undermined by claims of
religious freedom3° and "cultural exceptionalism."'
To be sure, the New Sovereignty emerges out of the old Enlightenment,
which theorized freedom in the public sphere in exchange for despotism in
the private.32 But the New Sovereignty is fueled by more recent
developments, as well. Specifically, the New Sovereignty must be seen in
response to the New Enlightenment. As this Article will illustrate through
numerous examples and case studies, today more and more individuals are
challenging traditional religious and cultural authorities and demanding
more reason, choice, liberty, and equality within their religious and cultural
communities. I call this the New Enlightenment. These individuals reject
the binary approach of the Enlightenment, which forces individuals to
choose between religious liberty (on leaders' terms) in the private sphere
and equality (without normative community) in the public sphere. Rather,
they articulate a vision of human flourishing that requires freedom within
the context of religious and cultural community. This vision includes not
only a right to equal treatment in one's cultural or religious community, but
also a right to engage in those communities on one's own terms.
In earlier work, I have described the emergence of these types of
normative claims as the rise of "cultural dissent., 33 Liberal histories
describe empowered selves rejecting community in favor of
individualism.34 Less remarked upon have been new social movements for a
right to constitute individual identity within communities, but with a right
to choice within those confines. As I have argued, cultural dissenters, or
30. See Mayer, supra note 10, at 21-32 (describing the growing popularity of arguments to
curtail women's rights in the name of "Islam"); Yasmin Abdullah, Note, The Holy See at United
Nations Conferences: State or Church?, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1835 (1996) (describing Vatican
campaigns against women's rights at international conferences in both Cairo and Beijing).
31. Thomas M. Franck, Are Human Rights Universal?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 191
(noting more cultural challenges to the universality of human rights); see also Louis HENKIN ET
AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 391 (1999) (writing that cultural relativism "presents a particularly acute
challenge in respect of women's human rights"); Berta Esperanza Hemndez-Truyol, Human
Rights Through a Gendered Lens: Emergence, Evolution, Revolution, in I WOMEN AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 3, 37 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 1999)
("[W]omen's rights are especially fragile to a claim of 'culture."'); Arati Rao, The Politics of
Gender and Culture in International Human Rights Discourse, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 167, 169 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds.,
1995) ("No social group has suffered greater violation of its human rights in the name of culture
than women."). The debate about whether human rights are compatible with "Asian values" has
been particularly heated. See generally THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
(Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999). For a trenchant reply to this claim, see Amartya
Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values, NEW REPUBLIC, July 14 & 21, 1997, at 33 (documenting
substantial theorizing about tolerance and freedom within Asian traditions).
32. See discussion infra Part I.
33. Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495,498-500, 516-23 (2001).
34, See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED SELF: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF
INDIVIDUALISM 74-75 (1999) (identifying a new right of individuals to define their identities
outside of traditional identities).
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"individuals within a community [who seek] to modernize, or broaden, the
traditional terms of cultural membership, '3 normatively challenge
traditional liberal understandings of liberty and equality as premised on a
"thin" theory of the self.36 Their claims suggest that traditional liberalism
takes too lightly the ease of exit from one's community and the desirability
of culture; I read in the rise of cultural dissent that human flourishing
requires not only a liberty right to normatiVe community, but access to
community free of the fear of discrimination within it. 37 Similarly, a
meaningful right to equality requires equality not just in the public sphere,
but also within the contexts of the communities that are important to
people.
But thus far, law has not recognized these new social movements.
Worse still, law has become complicit in the backlash efforts of
traditionalists to stymie these movements. 38  Premised upon old
Enlightenment notions that theorize freedom in the public sphere but not
the private, current law elides the claims of modernizers for freedom within
a cultural and religious context, and, paradoxically, sides with
findamentalist or traditionalist leaders instead. The upshot is that law,
rather than facilitating human rights and modernity, is buttressing the power
of traditionalists against change. This is the phenomenon I call the New
Sovereignty-the increasing use of law to protect and preserve cultural
stasis and hierarchy against the challenges to cultural and religious
authority emerging on the ground.
My argument on cultural dissent forms the first of a trilogy of works on
the theme of law's role in thwarting modernity and cultural change.39 The
instant Article forms the middle work in the trilogy. This Article
instantiates cultural dissent on a global scale through an examination of
women's human rights movements. Going further, it introduces the dual
concepts of the New Sovereignty and the New Enlightenment in order to
highlight the increasing role played by law in obstructing cultural dissent
and social change. Seeing these as parallel movements highlights that the
absence of law from religion is not natural. To the contrary, in a modem
world in which religious authority increasingly is buttressed by law, and not
internal norms, a legal veil, and not religion itself, will increasingly insulate
35. Sunder, supra note 33, at 498.
36. Id. at 551.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 500-03.
39. My first article in this series focused on freedom of association as guaranteed by the First
Amendment. See id. at 523, 523-48 (arguing, based on a close reading of Boy Scouts ofAmerica v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), that freedom-of-association law responds to increasing dissent and
expressive conflict within an association with "an all-out rescue mission" to protect the
association against "dilution" and change).
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religious community from modernity and change.40  Perhaps most
importantly, this Article advances my earlier work by identifying strategies
for implementing the New Enlightenment. It is neocritical in that, post-
critique, it proposes a blueprint for cultural reconstruction. It finds this
blueprint in the groundwork of women's human rights activism in Muslim
communities. In their praxis I identify an alternative between the euphoria
of liberal Enlightenment and the despair of cultural relativism. The final
work in the trilogy, fP3, examines how yet another legal domain-
intellectual property-is being deployed to stymie cultural change.4' It
suggests that the convergence of intellectual property, identity politics, and
the Internet Protocol creates a similarly volatile mixture of subaltern
empowerment and dominant backlash through law. 2
B. The New Enlightenment
Women activists working in Muslim communities on the frontlines of
the war against fundamentalism are laying the groundwork for a new vision
of human rights that would pierce the veil of religious sovereignty.
Women's human rights campaigns in Muslim communities fundamentally
challenge traditional human rights law, which views identity as imposed
and provides no individual right to contest cultural or religious norms from
within. Under current law, an individual may choose either to remain in a
discriminatory culture-on the leaders' terms-or to exit. Dissenters have
no right to stay within their communities and contest or reform them.43 Nor
is there any right to religion or culture on one's own terms-that is, to
plurality and choice within culture. In short, law requires women to choose
between religion and rights. Traditionally, feminists have accepted this
framework, arguing that when weighing religious freedom against equality,
women's rights should trump.44 Choosing rights over religion generally
40. See Sunder, supra note 33, at 509 (similarly noting, in the context of freedom-of-
association law, that "increasingly, it will be law, not culture, that regulates a community's
borders and determines how much information, autonomy, and cquality individuals within a
community will enjoy").
41. See Madhavi Sunder, [P3 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing
that while new technological and global architectures are empowering more people to proclaim
themselves as subjects, not objects, of culture, intellectual property law is capitulating to the
demands of traditional cultural producers in struggles to create and control cultural meanings).
42. See id.
43. Current law stresses alienability-the right to exit from and choose among competing
religions-at the expense of personhood, roots, and loyalty. For one critical perspective on this
approach, see Makau Wa Mutua, Limitations on Religious Rights: Problematizing Religious
Freedom in the African Context, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 417,417
(Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr., eds., 1996) (problematizing the "right to proselytize in
the marketplace of religions" at the expense of the cultural survival of less market-dominant
groups). See generallv MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996).
44. See Hilary Charlesworth, The Challenges of Human Rights Law for Religious Traditions,
in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 401 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 1999)
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entails either leaving one's community-literally seeking asylum
elsewhere 5-- or else praying that one's culture becomes "extinct. ' ' 6
Assaulting this binary discourse, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak described
Third World women as having to choose from either the colonizer's story
that "white men are saving brown women from brown men" or the
nativists' argument: "The women actually wanted to die.' *A7 With no
alternative discourse in sight, Spivak famously asked, "Can the subaltern
speak? '48 Now, rumblings from international women's human rights
campaigns in Muslim communities suggest that women are finding a voice.
Confronted with the same options today,49 women reformers in Muslim
(arguing that "the tradition of human rights [should] take precedence over religious traditions");
Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework for Conflict
Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 795, 828-29 (1992) (advocating a balancing approach to
religion and rights); cf Memorandum from Madhavi Sunder to Rhonda Copelon, Remedies for
Women Against Religious Intolerance: Possibilities for Bringing Claims Under the U.N.
Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance (Aug. 23, 1995) (on file with author) (arguing against a
dichotomized view of religion and women's human rights).
45. See Eve McCabe, Comment, The Inadequacy of International Human Rights Law To
Protect the Rights of Women as Illustrated by the Crisis in Afghanistan, 5 UCLA. J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 419, 422 (2000) (arguing that the inability of human rights law to address the
practices of groups such as the Taliban "leaves asylum law as the most viable instrument available
to women to address violations of their human rights").
46. Okin, supra note 9, at 22-23 (arguing that women from patriarchal minority cultures
"might be much better off if the culture into which they were born were either to become extinct
(so that its members would become integrated into the less sexist surrounding culture) or,
preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself so as to reinforce the equality of women").
47. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271, 296-97 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988). For
other critical examinations of the interplay between women, culture, postcoloniality, and rights,
see LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND GENDER IN ISLAM 244 (1992) (writing that the notion that
"progress for women could be achieved only through abandoning the native culture ... was the
product of... the discourses of patriarchal colonialism in the service of particular political ends");
KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002)
(highlighting indigenous and Third World women's anticolonial claims, which are obscured by
binary discourses of women's equality versus indigenous self-determination); MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 167-240
(2000); Lila Abu-Lughod, The Marriage of Feminism and Islamism in Egypt: Selective
Repudiation as a Dynamic of Posicolonial Cultural Politics, in REMAKING WOMEN: FEMINISM
AND MODERNITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 243, 262 (Lila Abu-Lughod ed., 1998) (offering a history
of Egyptian feminism that attempts to stand outside the tropes of cultural transplants, on the one
hand, and cultural authenticity, on the other); and Seyla Benhabib, Cultural Complexity, Moral
Interdependence, and the Global Dialogical Community, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND
DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 235, 240 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan
Glover eds., 1995).
48. Spivak, supra note 47, at 296. For incisive critiques of the trope of "saving" Muslim
women, see MARNIA LAZREG, THE ELOQUENCE OF SILENCE: ALGERIAN WOMEN IN QUESTION
(1994); Abu-Lughod, supra note 19, at 787 (warning that "we need to be vigilant about the
rhetoric of saving people"); and Lata Mani, Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in
Colonial India, in RECASTING WOMEN: ESSAYS TN INDIAN COLONIAL HISTORY 88 (Kumkum
Sangari & Sudesh Vaid eds., 1989).
49. See Farida Shaheed, The Other Side of the Discourse: Women's Experiences of Identity,
Religion and Activism in Pakistan, in SHAPING WOMEN'S LIVES: LAWS, PRACTICES AND
STRATEGIES IN PAKISTAN 415, 441 (Farida Shaheed et al. eds., 1998) (observing that
"[i]ncreasingly, vast numbers of women whose faith is a living reality are being pushed into a no-
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communities increasingly refuse to choose between religion and rights
50
and demand both. 51 Turning traditional legal understandings of the "right to
religion" and the "right to culture" on their heads, these activists are
rejecting law's deference to the views of religious leaders and demanding
an individual right to construct one's identity, not just without religious and
cultural community but also within it. As one activist put it, women "must
have the right to challenge both the doctrinaire, legalistic version of religion
and the ethnic and religious chauvinism currently ascendant in the political
arena without, necessarily, being obliged to renounce their religion or their
ethnic identity.,5 2 Recognizing that neither legal doctrine nor theory
adequately addresses their interest in freedom within identity,53 activists are
forging their own strategies and theories that allow for both culture and
change.
This is an important new conception of women's human rights, and of
freedom itself. While feminists have made important inroads in challenging
win choice: to give up their faith altogether or to conform to the dictates of groups whose political
agendas are cloaked in religious discourse" (citations omitted)).
50. See, e.g., FAITH AND FREEDOM: WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD
(Mahnaz Aftdhami ed., 1995); Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim
Women's Rights, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (1997) (describing many Muslim women as
wanting "to be good Muslims, but [wanting] to have their rights as well"); Azizah Y. al-Hibri,
Deconstructing Patriarchal Jurisprudence in Islamic Law: A Faithful Approach, in GLOBAL
CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER 221, 229 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed.,
2000) (asserting that "the solution to Muslim women's human rights problems is not to ask these
women to cast away their deepest beliefs in search of a Western quick fix"); Radhika
Coomaraswamy, Different but Free: Cultural Relativism and Women 's Rights as Human Rights,
in RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 79, 85-87 (Courtney W.
Howland ed., 1999) (rejecting an either/or approach that would "balance" women's rights against
freedom of religion in favor of an approach that embraces both religion and equality).
51. See discussion infra Part III. In highlighting the challenges of Muslim women activists to
traditional notions of religion and culture, I do not mean to essentialize them as more religious
than non-Muslims. In fact, women's rights activists in the Muslim world engage in numerous
strategies for women's rights "from the exclusively secular to the exclusively theological, with
many permutations in between." Farida Shaheed, Controlled or Autonomous: Identity and the
Experience of the Network, Women Living Under Muslim Laws, 19 SIGNS 997, 999 (1994).
52. Shaheed, supra note 49, at 442.
53. Id. (describing this as a "neglected area... both in scholarship and in activism"); see also
Bahia Tahzib-Lie, Applying a Gender Perspective in the Area of the Right to Freedom of Religion
or Belief 2000 BYU L. REV. 967, 969 (2000) (arguing that "[dissenting] women who object to
certain interpretations of their religion or belief imposed by religious leaders or society or women
who are committed to a different religion or belief from that of the wider society" are often
overlooked in analyses of the "right to freedom of religion"); Bahia G. Tahzib-Lie, Women's
Equal Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: An Important but Neglected Subject, in RELIGIOUS
FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 50, at 117 (observing the
absence of any global document addressing women's equal right to freedom of religion).
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im's work is a notable exception. See ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM,
TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 10 (1990); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Human Rights in the Muslim World.- Socio-
Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, A Preliminary Inquiry, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13,
15, 21 (1990) [hereinafter An-Na'im, Human Rights] (concluding that "human rights advocates in
the Muslim world must work within the framework of Islam to be effective" and asserting that "a
modem 'Shari'a' could be... entirely consistent with current standards of human rights").
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the absolute sovereignty of the private sphere, 4 particularly on the issue of
violence,5 5 women's rights to contest and create normative community-
that is, to make cultural meanings-have been far less theorized. Muslim
women's claims suggest that women's human rights must go beyond
freedom from violence to freedom to make the world.
Where law has faltered, new intellectual disciplines such as cultural
studies and subaltern studies have stepped in to support such efforts. Unlike
traditional human rights law, which despite its universal aspirations is
marked by cultural relativism, 5 6 these disciplines theorize change within
cultural communities.57  Going further, subaltern studies confronts
traditional models of representing, or telling stories about, change. In an
important book, Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty critiques what
he calls Western "historicism," which posits a singular future for all the
world's people in which to have justice and to be a "modem individual"
54. See Hemdndez-Truyol, supra note 31, at 32 (describing the public/private dichotomy as
"slowly being eviscerated" by feminists). For trenchant critiques of the public/private dichotomy,
see Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 379, 382-83
(1999) (arguing that law's noninterference in the private domain legitimates and supports the
power of men over women); Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday.
Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 342 (1994) (examining
"whether state involvement in the commission of the offense is the sine qua non of the definition
of torture as a violation of international human rights"); Hilary Charlesworth, The Public/Private
Distinction and the Right to Development in International Law 1, at
http://www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/diana/fulltext/char2.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2001) (arguing that
international law "is built on paradigms which privilege a male perspective," specifically, the
public/private perspective that is central to liberalism).
55. See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item IH, at 4, U.N. Doc. AIRES/48/104 (1994) ("States should
condemn violence against women and should not invoke any custom, tradition or religious
consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its elimination.").
56. See Karen Engle, From Skepticism to Embrace: Human Rights and the American
Anthropological Association from 1947-1999, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 536 (2001) (describing human
rights law as culturally relativist); see also Martin Chanock, "Culture" and Human Rights:
Orientalising, Occidentalising and Authenticity, in BEYOND RIGHTS TALK AND CULTURE TALK:
COMPARATIVE ESSAYS ON THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS AND CULTURE 15, 15 (Mahmood Mamdani
ed., 2000) (writing that sophisticated understandings of culture are "curiously absent from the
notions of 'culture' used in the human rights dcbates, in which the sacralised idea of culture still
dominates"); Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams, The Unsettled Status of Human Rights: An
Introduction, in HUMAN RiGHTS: CONCEPTS, CONTESTS, CONTINGENCIES 1, 16-17 (Austin Sarat
& Thomas R. Kearns eds., 2001) (describing the traditional conception of culture in human rights
law as discreet and homogeneous). The historical bent toward cultural relativism in traditional
anthropology reflects the influence of anthropologist Franz Boas, who affirmed cultural relativism
as a critique of imperialism and racism. See ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY: THE
RELATIVITY OF VALUES IN ANTHROPOLOGY 8 (1983); ADAM KUPER, CULTURE: THE
ANTHROPOLOGISTS' ACCOUNT 2 (1999).
57. See, e.g., GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL
POLITICS 197 (1987) ("The work of the Subaltern Studies group offers a theory of change.").
Cultural studies spotlight the "radical social and cultural transformation" of contemporary global
society. See generally Cary Nelson et al., Cultural Studies: An Introduction, in CULTURAL
STUDIES 1, 5, 8-9 (Lawrence Grossberg et al. eds., 1992). For more background in cultural studies
theory, see John Fiske, Cultural Studies and the Culture of Everyday Life, in CULTURAL STUDIES,
supra, at 154; and Richard Johnson, What Is Cultural Studies, Anyway?, 16 SOC. TEXT 38 (1986-
1987).
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means to become "a European., 58 In the historicist view, the world's future
is marked by classic ideas of secularism-that is, by adherence to the rule
of law in the public sphere, with identity, community, and "despotism" 59
reserved to the private sphere. Cultures marked by anything less than this
ideal separation between public and private, Chakrabarty writes, are
characterized as in transition or developing, sitting in an "imaginary
waiting room of history', 60 until they are ready to claim the mantle of the
"modem."
Under the historicist view, the continuing commitment of Muslim
women activists to religion seems anachronistic; only their commitment to
"rights" resonates. But as Chakrabarty argues, such historicism obscures the
continuing reality of religion, culture, peasantry, and parochialism in our
present. By conceiving of these phenomena as something in the past to be
overcome, transition narratives "blind us to the responsibility of looking at
the shapes and forms our modernity is taking., 61 A goal of subaltern
studies, in contrast, is to see how individuals are living in the present,
negotiating universal ideals about law, justice, and rights with their
continuing commitment to religion and culture.62 Complicating historicist
descriptions of change, subaltern studies pluralize and plot reform
movements, in Spivak's words, "as confrontations rather than transition.
' 63
In the next two Parts, I contrast these narratives in the context of
international law. While a confrontation narrative informed by subaltern
studies reads Muslim women as remaking international law, and not simply
receiving it,64 the traditional legal narrative of law in transition elides this
58. DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE 33 (2000).
59. Dipesh Chakrabarty, Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for
"Indian " Pasts?, in A SUBALTERN STUDIES READER, 1986-1995, at 263, 269 (Ranajit Guha ed.,
1997) (defining "despotism" not as "a government of mere caprice and whim," but as "the
opposite of English constitutional government").
60. CHAKRABARTY, supra note 58, at 8.
61. Id. at 235-36 (quoting Sudipta Kaviraj's observation that "the more modernity unfolds
[the more] it seems to appear inescapably plural").
62. Chakrabarty is careful to note that he is not "shunning European thought," which "is a gift
to us all," but merely questioning its totalizing features. Id. at 255. At the same time, subaltern
studies is philosophically grounded "in a radical critique and transcendence of liberalism,"
particularly of liberalism's "bureaucratic" conception of citizenship and the modem state. See
Chakrabarty, supra note 59, at 286.
63. SPIVAK, supra note 57, at 197.
64. My readings of Muslim women's human rights campaigns are consistent with Harold
Koh's descriptions of "transnational legal process" and Anne-Marie Slaughter's "new real world
order." Koh and Slaughter demonstrate how transnational and nonstate actors are renegotiating the
meaning of international law to suit their evolving needs and aspirations. See generally Harold
Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-84 (1996) (describing
"transnational legal process" as the theory and practice of how public and private actors-nation-
states, international organizations, multinational enterprises, nongovernmental organizations, and
private individuals-interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and international fora to
make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of transnational law); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183 (describing the
new world governance system as a network, or "dense web of relations" between a changing cast
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story. The transition narrative does not merely construct religion as law's
"other," but also thwarts the new constructions of religion and its
relationship to law that the New Enlightenment envisions. It is to this
narrative that I now turn.
1. TRANSITION
A. Law's "Past"
International law ceremoniously recounts its birth in 1648.65 This date
simultaneously marks the end of a great religious conflict (the Thirty Years'
War), which brought down the Holy Roman Empire, and the Peace of
Westphalia, which created the modem nation-state system. Starting law's
story here is important. By placing itself temporally after religion-and, as
we shall see, as a philosophical response to the problem of religion-in one
swift move, religion is constructed as law's past.66 The period of the
Empire prior to 1648 is marked by a rule of religious ideology claiming to
be universal.67  This ideology was imposed; it was irrational and
undemocratic. In contrast, the emerging nation-state system, built on
notions of equality and enforceable agreement, symbolized the response of
philosophy and reason to the chaos of religion. If religion was law's past,
law was to be religion's future.
Law's transition narrative was characteristic of the Enlightenment era.
Also known as the Age of Reason, the period from the late seventeenth
through the end of the eighteenth century was preoccupied with touting the
preeminence of reason, science, and law over the absurdities of religion,
which was thought to leave men in a state of perpetual "immaturity. "
68
of transnational state and nonstate actors). See also W. Michael Reisman, International
Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, The Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture (Apr. 24,
1981), in SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 497 (Martti Koskenniemi ed., 2000) (outlining the
New Haven School, or Communications Theory of international law, which envisions
international legal rules as "continuously being fashioned and refashioned by a wide variety of
global actors to suit the needs of the living"); discussion infra Part III, Secion IV.A.
65. See JORGFN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY: TWELVE
LECTURES 17 (Frederick Lawrence trans., MIT Press 1987) (describing the Peace of Westphalia
as the beginning of law and as a dismantling of the "world of the divine"); David Kennedy,
Images of Religion in International Legal Theory, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 44, at 145, 146; Hilaire McCoubrey, Natural Law, Religion and the Development of
International Law, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 44, at 177, 179.
66. As David Kennedy quips, "Religion is something we used to have." Kennedy, supra note
65, at 145.
67. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 112 (describing "a pre-legal international world of politics,
war, religion, and ideology").
68. IMMANUEL KANT, An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?, in PERPETUAL
PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY, AND MORALS 41, 41 (Ted Humphrey trans.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1983) (1795) (defining enlightenment as "man's emergence from his self-
imposed immaturity").
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Where the final end was the attainment of Truth, philosophers from Ren6
Descartes to John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and David Hume argued that
freedom by way of exercising one's own reason-not blindly following the
church-was the surest path to enlightenment.69 With the help of
philosophes from Voltaire to Diderot, who translated the grand
philosophers' ideas to the people, the idea that reason (exercised through
science, politics, and law) would overpower-and eventually vanquish-
religion grew.70  Nineteenth-century evolutionary theory continued to
conceive of religion as "an early human condition from which modem law,
science, and politics emerged and became detached.",7 1 In the twentieth
century, Max Weber and adherents of Karl Marx would advance similar
theses about the inevitable obsolescence of religion.72
We see the narrative at work in the intellectual history of international
law. While Christianity undoubtedly influenced international law, 73 the
discipline's leading thinkers-the "fathers of international law"-sought to
distance themselves from law's religious past. In this effort, some were
more successful than others. While Hugo Grotius, the first "father of
international law," believed in secular law, his writings nonetheless
grounded the new discipline in natural law theories. 74 Over time, the
discipline moved further away from religion, with some help from another
"father," Emmerich de Vattel.75
Human rights law has pursued a similar, albeit shorter, path. Born from
the ashes of World War II, human rights law also has sought to transition
69. See FRANK E. MANUEL, THE AGE OF REASON 32 (1951) (describing the Enlightenment
view that religion "was nothing but an absurd imposition upon the ignorant"). "Religion was
struck at because it was not rational," Manuel wrote. Id. at 33. "Even more," he continued, "it was
attacked as a patent fraud, the artifice of those who controlled the instruments of the cult." Id.
70. Id. at 26-31.
71. TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 27 (1993).
72. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALIsM 70
(Talcott Parsons trans., Routledge 1992) (1904) ("The people filled with the spirit of capitalism
to-day tend to be indifferent, if not hostile, to the Church.").
73. See James A.R. Nafziger, The Functions of Religion in the International Legal System, in
RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 44, at 155, 162 ("Scholars generally
agree... that much modem international law grew out of Christian civilization.").
74. Mark W. Janis, Religion and the Literature of International Law: Some Standard Texts,
in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 44, at 121, 122-23 (describing Grotius as a
thinker who labored to construct a field of international law that "sought to moderate the excesses
of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648)," but who "throughout De Jure Belli Ac Pacis... relied
heavily on proofs and evidences from the Bible to demonstrate the truth of his propositions");
McCoubrey, supra note 65, at 183 ("The work of Hugo Grotius was far less a break with the past
than is sometimes supposed.").
75. Janis, supra note 74, at 127-28 (finding Vattel more committed to a secular theory of
international law and more skeptical of religion than was Grotius). Janis notes that while Grotius
closed his 17th-century text "with a prayer," Vattel's famous The Law of Nations (1758)
concluded with a quintessential "18th century Age of Reason passage" that made its "final appeal
not to God but to accuracy and utility." Id. at 126.
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away from religion and natural law 76 to become a purely "secular matter.,
77
Thus, while human rights may be better guaranteed if one were to find
religious justifications for them, the point is that such justifications are not
required.78
B. Law's "Other"
Of course, law's transition from religion did not excise religion from
our lives. To the contrary, it simply excised religion from law, and vice
versa. In the real world, religion remains, but as an "extralegal field," 79
banished from the public and reserved to the private sphere.80 Seeking to
make a clean break with the past, 8' law could separate from religion only by
definitional fiat, constructing religion as something wholly distinct from
law-that is, as law's "other. 82
The Enlightenment facilitated this partition. At the same time that
international law emerged as a discipline governing the public realm,
Enlightenment theory did the important work of transforming the
conception of religion from political ideology to personal belief. As Talal
Asad recounts in his Genealogy of Religion, European historians contend
that "the constitution of the modem state required the forcible redefinition
of religion as belief, and of religious belief, sentiment, and identity as
personal matters that belong to the newly emerging space of private (as
opposed to public) life."
83
According to Kant and his colleagues, one could acquire enlightenment
by transcending his religious passions and applying reason. Significantly,
enlightenment was fully attainable through the exercise of reason in the
76. The foundational documents of international human rights law-the United Nations
Charter (1945), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), and the
International Covenant on Cultural and Economic Rights (1976)--all reflect natural law origins.
See Hemindez-Truyol, supra note 3 1, at 21.
77. RHODA E. HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 12 (1995)
(writing that human rights "are derived from human thought about the nature of justice, not from
divine decree"). As Kennedy describes, modem human rights law reflects a "[p]ost-
enlightenment, rationalist, secular, Western, modem, capitalist" philosophy. Kennedy, supra note
14, at 114.
78. See HOWARD, supra note 77, at 12.
79. Kennedy, supra note 65, at 149.
80. David Kennedy, Losing Faith in the Secular: Law, Religion, and the Culture of
International Governance, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 44, at 309, 313
("Religion was to be respected, even honored, in its own sphere-the domain of private
commitment and spiritual meaning.").
81. See Kennedy, supra note 65, at 146 (describing law's view of its own birth as pristine,
believing that it "shares nothing with the messy collapse itself").
82. See Gustavo Benavides, Modernity, in CRITICAL TERMS FOR RELIGIOUS STUDIES 186,
196 (Mark C. Taylor ed., 1998) (describing secularization as leading, not to the "disappearance of
religion," but rather to the "differentiation and narrowing of the institutional religious realm").
83. ASAD, supra note 71, at 205.
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public sphere alone, even if individuals lacked the same liberty in the
private sphere.8 4 "The public use of one's reason must always be free, and it
alone can bring about enlightenment among mankind," Kant wrote.85 But,
he continued, "the private use of reason may... often be very narrowly




The fact that religion and reason could coexist, albeit separately, made
enlightenment, in Kant's words, a "least harmful" proposition. 7 The
revolutionary concept of enlightenment was acceptable precisely because it
did not reject, but rather cabined, religion, attempting to control religious
passions by carefully tucking them away in the private sphere. 88 Freedom in
the public sphere became freedom itself; the private sphere could continue
to harbor passion and unreason without inhibiting freedom.
But controlling religion entailed far more than spatial separation. The
redefinition of religion as belief, or something internal and private, turned
on conceiving of religion as both foundationally and functionally distinct
from the public fields of law and science. Foundationally, religion as belief
was not premised upon reason-unlike science, it was not something that
could be tested, challenged, or questioned. To the contrary, Kant and Hume
argued that religion was inherently incapable of being understood through
reason because the only proof of God was faith. 89 In contrast to "rational"
subjects such as law and science-open knowledge systems continually and
rationally tested against new and external ideas-religion as a knowledge
84. See KANT, supra note 68, at 42 ("Nothing is required for this enlightenment, however,
except freedom; and the freedom in question is the least harmful of all, namely, the freedom to use
reason publicly in all matters.").
85. Id.
86. ld. Kant defined the public use of one's reason as the use of reason before the public, or
"the entire literate world." He called "the private use of reason that which a person may make in a
civic post or office that has been entrusted to him"--that is, in the private sphere. Id.
87. Id.
88. That said, Kant (and Hume) may not have conceived of the stark separation of public and
private that we have today. For example, Kant described the following situation as "wholly
impossible" and unacceptable in an enlightened society:
But would a society of pastors, perhaps a church assembly or venerable
presbytery... not be justified in binding itself by oath to a certain unalterable symbol
in order to secure a constant guardianship over each of its members and through them
over the people, and this for all: I say this is wholly impossible. Such a contract, whose
intention is to preclude forever all further enlightenment of the human race, is
absolutely null and void ....
-d. at 43.
89. See DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Charles W.
Hendel ed., Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1995) (1748); IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WIrHIN THE
BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON (Allen Wood & George di Giovanni eds. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1998) (1793). Interestingly, preeminent scientists have made similar arguments in the
modem day. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, ROCKS OF AGES: SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE
FULLNESS OF LIFE 111 (1999) (rejecting the "model of warfare between science and religion"
because what distinguishes the two is reason).
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system was premised upon closure. Religious beliefs appeared absolute and
bounded, incapable of being tested or judged.90
Undoubtedly, these Enlightenment views influenced later
anthropological and sociological understandings of religion.9" As the
anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski famously wrote of religion in a 1936
essay, "It is not easy to dissect with the cold knife of logic what can only be
accepted with a complete surrender of heart." 92 Even the influential
anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, although usefully conceiving of religion as
a cultural system consisting of meanings, signs, and symbols,93 ultimately
characterized religion as a closed system of meaning, in contrast to open
systems such as law and science. 94 The presumed lack of contestation
within religious communities contributed to the depiction of religion as
internally homogeneous. Indeed, Emile Durkheim defined religion as "a
unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things.., beliefs
and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church,
all those who adhere to them." 95 Durkheim believed religious systems were
distinct and wholly separate from one another and internally unified.
96
Thus, religion continued to be understood as inherently personal,97
uncontestable, homogeneous, and communal.98
While religion's irrationality and spirituality made it unsuitable for law
and science, it was perfectly suited for different functions. Where law and
90. Thomas Paine wrote that "[rleason is the forbidden tree of priest-craft." T.P. [Thomas
Paine], Of the Religion of Deism Compared with the Christian Religion and the Superiority of the
Former over the Latter, I PROSPECT; OR, VIEW OF THE MORAL WORLD 235, 244 (1804); see also
CORNEL WEST, The Historicist Turn in Philosophy of Religion, in THE CORNEL WEST READER
360, 361 (1999) (writing that "post-Humean and post-Kantian philosophers of religion were
forced either to give up or to redefine the scientific character of religious beliefs and thereby to
conceptually redes cribe such beliefs in moral, affective, aesthetic or existential terms").
91. See ASAD, supra note 71, at 207 (acknowledging that "the concepts and practices of
religion and state have not remained unchanged since Kant," but, nonetheless, "liberals continue
to invoke his principle of the public use of reason as the arbiter of true knowledge").
92. BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, The Foundations of Faith and Morals, in MALINOWSKI AND
THE WORK OF MYTH 131, 133-34 (Ivan Strenski ed., 1992).
93. Clifford Geertz, Religion as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES
87,89 (1973).
94. Id. at 125; see also CLIFFORD GEERTZ, ISLAM OBSERVED: RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT IN
MOROCCO AND INDONESIA (1968).
95. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 44 (Karen E. Fields
trans., Free Press 1995) (1912).
96. Id. at 38 (writing that when a "certain number of sacred things have relations of
coordination and subordination with one another, so as to form a system that has a certain
coherence and does not belong to any other system of the same sort, then the belief and rites,
taken together, constitute a religion").
97, Twentieth-century theorists critiqued the evolutionary view of religion as past, but
continued to understand religion as "a distinctive space of human practice and belief." ASAD,
supra note 71, at 27.
98. Id. at 9 (characterizing religion as "an eminently social thing. Religious representations
are collective representations that express collective realities; rites are ways of acting that are born
only in the midst of assembled groups and whose purpose is to evoke, maintain, or recreate certain
mental states of those groups.").
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science would satisfy individuals' material needs, religion and culture
provided that more elusive good: meaning. 99 Malinowski ends his famous
essay, The Foundation of Faith and Morals, with a plea imploring all
people to "work for the maintenance of the eternal truths which have guided
mankind out of barbarism to culture, and the loss of which seems to
threaten us with barbarism again."100 Religion, Malinowski concluded,
provides society with those "indispensable pragmatic figments without
which civilization cannot exist."'
01
In short, religion could coexist with law so long as the two remained
separate, 10 2 and forcefully so.103 Going further, their distinctiveness required
their coexistence. Religion (now moved to the private sphere) was left to
govern moral life, while law (in the public sphere) would govern material
and political life. Development and modernity are defined by the perfect
separation of law and religion into distinct, sovereign jurisdictions.
C. Constructing and Obstructing
Revisiting law's story reveals not only how law has objectified religion
but, more importantly, sheds light on how law's transition narrative
obstructs new constructions of religion. In order to justify legal control of
the public sphere, the Enlightenment banished religion from its jurisdiction
and constructed religion as a separate, sovereign sphere in which the law
does not belong. But in fact, law does far more than simply cabin or confine
religious passion. In ceding complete authority to religion without
subjecting it to tests of rationality and legitimacy, law plays a far more
99. See, e.g., PAUL TILLICH, WHAT IS RELIGION? 60 (James L. Adams ed., 1969) ("Religion
is the sum total of all spiritual acts directed towards grasping the unconditional import of meaning
through the fulfillment of the unity of meaning.").
100. MALNOWSKI, supra note 92, at 172.
101. Id.
102. Significantly, anthropologists such as E.B. Tylor and James George Frazer defined
magic as primitive beliefs and practices that attempted to interpret the world rationally, in contrast
to religion, which was characterized in spiritual, nonrational terms. Defining religion and magic
this way enabled scholars to predict that science would replace magic (revealing the empirical
observations of magic to be mistaken, incomplete, or faulty), while religion would remain. See
Stephen Sharot, Magic, Religion, Science, and Secularization, in RELIGION, SCIENCE, AND
MAGIC: IN CONCERT AND IN CONFLICT 261, 262 (Jacob Neusner et al. eds., 1989)
("Religion ... is defined only in terms of its difference from science so that there is no question of
its being replaced by science."). See generally JAMES GEORGE FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH: A
STUDY IN MAGIC AND RELIGION 58 (1930) (describing mankind's "great transition from magic to
religion" as a process by which man admitted that he could not control nature and thus gradually
came to believe, or to have faith, in beings higher than man who did exert such control); EDWARD
BURNETT TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE (1871) (laying a foundation for an understanding of
religion as "belief').
103. Kennedy, supra note 65, at 149 (describing "law's singular and repressive relationship
to religion"); see also id. ("It is unsurprising that a law so constructed would be obsessed with the
relationship, the line, the distinction, between international law and sovereignty .... ").
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active role in defending a particular conception of religion and, ultimately,
in obstructing change.
As we shall see more fully in Part III, individuals on the ground are
increasingly challenging the traditional Enlightenment view of religion,
both descriptively and prescriptively. Case studies of women human rights
reformers in Muslim communities show women contesting traditionalist
and fundamentalist dogma and thereby undermining the myth of
homogeneous and static religious identity. At the same time, women
reformers are making new normative claims, asserting a new right to define
their religious identity themselves. While these claims suggest that religious
identity was always more contested than traditional Enlightenment theory
revealed, they also suggest that today more of one's religious identity than
ever before is contestable and subject to reconstruction.1
0 4
Thus far, however, law has not recognized these claims, preferring
instead seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Enlightenment views that
define freedom as reason in the public sphere and preserve religion as a
sphere without rights. Because law views religion as static and unchanging,
law fails to recognize contestation within religious communities, making it
more difficult to bring about changes on the ground. Worse still, current
law actively advantages the status quo and status quo elites in these
communities. 05
New Enlightenment claims are defeated at law's door because the
modem legal view of religion is not substantially different from the
traditional one. As Alan Brownstein describes, freedom of religion in the
United States continues to be defined as an inherently individual or
dignitary right to personal belief.10 6 Recently, there has been a movement
toward viewing religion in more communal-rather than individual-
terms, 10 7 particularly focusing on the right of religious groups to contribute
104. For a similar argument about the movement from status to contract in the relationship
between individuals and culture, see Sunder, supra note 33, at 522 (describing how cultural
membership has evolved from Pierre Bourdieu's notion of culture as "habitus"-something that
determines one's identity-toward a conception of culture as evolving and constructed from the
bottom up).
105. One could go further and suggest that law actively shapes religious community. It may
be the case, for example, that religious leaders take fundamentalist positions because that is what
the law expects of them.
106. Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The
Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 89, 95 (1990) (defining, from a U.S. constitutional standpoint, the free exercise of religion as
"essentially a dignitary right," and explaining that "[i]t is part of that basic autonomy of identity
and self-creation which we preserve from state manipulation, not because of its utility to social
organization, but because of its importance to the human condition").
107. Stephen L. Carter, Liberal Hegemony and Religious Resistance: An Essay on Legal
Theory, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 25, 37 (Michael W. McConnell et al.
eds., 2001) (describing religion as "a communal rather than an individual exercise").
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to public debate. 10 8 Michael McConnell, for example, critiques the
Enlightenment roots of liberal secularism, not because traditional
discourses take the public out of the private, but rather, because these
discourses blunt the influence of religion in the public sphere. 10 9 But
religious sovereignty in the private sphere has gone virtually unchallenged.
In fact, this sovereignty appears so strong today that we are witnessing
more "like religion"110 arguments, in which groups-even those that have
suffered discrimination in the name of religion-seek their own rights to be
let alone, rather than rights to contest religious sovereignty."1 '
While law remains true to its origins, scholars outside law are
beginning to challenge the binaries of traditional Enlightenment
discourse. 1 2 For some time, progressive, feminist, and even Third World
108. See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment
Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673 (2002) (describing the transformation in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence from protecting the individual liberty of conscience of religious dissenters toward
guaranteeing the political equality of religious minorities). Perhaps the most significant debates on
this issue revolve around those who challenge John Rawls's theory of "public reason," which
argues that in a constitutional regime "we must each give up forever the hope of changing the
constitution so as to establish our religion's hegemony." See JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public
Reason Revisited, in TIlE LAW OF PEOPLES 129, 150 (1999). 1 do not engage this debate here,
focusing instead on the more often ignored question of the role of exercising reason within the
religious sphere, rather than religion in the public sphere.
109. See Michael W. McConnell, "God Is Dead and We Have Killed Him!". Freedom of
Religion in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 BYU L. REV. 163, 166; Michael W. McConnell, Old
Liberalism, New Liberalism, and People of Faith, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL
THOUGHT, supra note 107, at 5 (chastising secularism for its presumption that the public sphere
can exist without religion).
110. 1 am tracking Janet Halley's identification of "like race" arguments, in which groups
analogize discrimination against them to that suffered by racial minorities, in hopes of obtaining
greater legal protection. See Janet E. Halley, "Like Race" Arguments, in WHAT'S LEFT OF
THEORY?: NEW WORK ON THE POLITICS OF LITERARY THEORY 40 (Judith Butler et al. eds.,
2000).
111. See David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2002)
(arguing that sexuality should be treated like religion and accorded a similar degree of personal
autonomy); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion,
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J.
2411,2411 (1997) (writing that the "public law consensus to preserve and protect the autonomy of
religious and ethnic subcultures" should be extended to sexual minorities); Andrew Koppelman,
Three Arguments for Gay Rights, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1636, 1648 (1997) (noting that protection for
gay rights can be invoked by analogy to the protection of religious minorities, "who exercise
[their] important [religious] liberty in unpopular ways").
112. See CORNEL WEST, Religion and the Left, in THE CORNEL WEST READER, supra note
90, at 372; Janet R. Jakobsen & Ann Pellegrini, Getting Religion, in WOMEN, GENDER,
RELIGION: A READER 518, 525 (Elizabeth A. Castelli ed., 2001) (expressing concern that
scholars' exclusive focus on "fundamentalism" reinforces the notion of religion as irrational
without taking the responsibility of understanding the moderate and modem forces within
religion); Russell T. McCutcheon, The Category "Religion " in Recent Publications: A Critical
Survey, 42 NUMEN 284,285-87 (1995) (comparing characterizations of religion as an essence with
more critical approaches); Miriam Peskowitz, What's in a Name? Exploring the Dimensions of
What "Feminist Studies in Religion " Means, in WOMEN, GENDER, RELIGION: A READER, supra,
at 29, 29 (asking: "What happens as we write about women and gender while simultaneously
making visible the Enlightenment constructs that restrict the imagination of women and gender in
the first place?"); Randi R. Warne, Gender, in GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF RELIGION 140, 151 (Willi
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actors have been influenced by Enlightenment beliefs that freedom is
possible only in secular terms. 13 But now some question the extent to
which acceptance of the Enlightenment's public/private dichotomy has
turned on downplaying discrimination in the private sphere, especially
discrimination against women.'1 4 These scholars challenge the notion that
freedom in the public sphere is enough and assert that the private sphere
should be a sphere in which we may demand reason and rights.
While traditional theories of religion as a sphere of injustice held
religious beliefs to be unchanging, contemporary theorists argue that, in
fact, religion is much more internally contested and subject to reasoned
argument and change than earlier theorists acknowledged.' 1 5 Key to this
notion of religion as mutable, rather than a natural, unchanging essence, is
the observation that while the subject matter of religion is spiritual and
textual, it is human beings who interpret religion and make it meaningful
for their time. The fundamentally human aspects of religion and culture,
then, may be subject to tests of rationality and legitimacy. As Bhikhu
Parekh writes, "The divine will is a matter of human definition and
interpretation, and requires [human beings] to show why they interpret their
religion in one way rather than another and why they think that their
interpretation entails a particular form of behaviour."'"16 "Religion does
Braun & Russell T. McCutcheon eds., 2000) (critiquing the secularization narrative, which makes
the public sphere preeminent over the private). Within law, David Kennedy's critical work on
religion and law is a notable exception. See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 115 (arguing that human
rights discourse "overemphasizes" the naturalness of religion and "underestimates" religion's
"plasticity").
113. See CHAKRABARTY, supra note 58, at 4 ("Modem social critiques of caste, oppressions
of women, the lack of rights for laboring and subaltern classes in India, and so on-and, in fact,
the very critique of colonialism itself-are unthinkable except as a legacy, partially, of how
Enlightenment Europe was appropriated in the [Indian] subcontinent."); WEST, supra note 112, at
373 (writing that "[i]n Europe-where the Enlightenment ethos remained (and still remains)
hegemonic among intellectuals and the literate middle classes-secular sensibilities were nearly
prerequisite for progressive outlooks, and religious beliefs usually a sign of political reaction");
Elizabeth A. Castelli, Women, Gender, Religion: Troubling Categories and Transforming
Knowledge, in WOMEN, GENDER, RELIGION: A RFADER, supra note 112, at 3, 5 ("It has been an
obstacle to some conversations that many feminists. . have tended to read 'religion' as an
abstraction solely in negative terms ...."); Shaheed, supra note 49, at 416 (writing that Pakistani
leaders "had internalized the premise of the colonial discourse that any religious/cultural tradition
deviating from the approved Eurocentric Christian tradition was incompatible with the desired
goal of modernity and progress").
114. See, e.g., Suad Joseph, Gendering Citizenship in the Middle East, in GENDER AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE MIDDLE EAST 3, 25-26 (Suad Joseph ed., 2000) (arguing that civil society
theorists' "overprivileging of the public sphere as a source of democracy and the exclusive focus
on the public/private binary have been made possible by glossing over gendered antidemocratic
forces").
115. See ASAD, supra note 71, at 236 ("Religious traditions have undergone the most radical
transformations over time.").
116. BHIKHU PAREKH, RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM: CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND
POLITICAL THEORY 334-3 5 (2000). Parekh writes:
There is a pervasive tendency among religious people to claim to be in possession of
divinely vouchsafed infallible truths which they are not at liberty to compromise. This
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involve faith," Parekh admits, "but it is not a matter of faith alone, which is
why the two should not be equated. It involves judgment, choice and
decision, and hence reason and personal responsibility."
117
Finally, Enlightenment definitions of religion as "natural" and as
personal belief obscure the role of politics-and more importantly power-
in religious contexts." 8 Religion has become "problematically detached
from the specific historical contexts, social frameworks, political struggles,
and institutional constraints that have produced it."1 19 Thus, traditional
anthropologists are criticized for being more concerned with discerning
what constitutes Truth in various religions-that is, in studying the
religious object-than with studying how and by whom religion as an
object came to be produced.12
0
In short, religion's conceptualization as law's other not only helps to
confine religion but also to defend it.1 21 The Enlightenment rendered
religion immutable and without need for justification or legitimacy-
religion cannot be defended against irrationality because irrationality is
thought to be its essence.' 22 Heterogeneity and critical discourses within
religion are subverted in favor of the imposed views of religious leaders. 
123
Religion is studied and preserved as a fixed, unchanging object rather than
as an ever-shifting, subjective construct.
Revealing this relationship between law and religion suggests that law
does more than cabin and control religion. In defending the near absolute
sovereignty of religion, law has ceded enormous power to the private
sphere and, in the process, has created a different kind of beast. The
perverse result of "othering" discourses is that the "other" often
appropriates its negative image and wears it with pride. Thus, we see law's
fundamentalist view of religion being reproduced by religious
fundamentalists, who hold themselves out as an alternative to the West's
morally defunct, bureaucratic rationality. More significantly, religious
leaders take advantage of a legal tradition that does not think critically
is a wholly false reading of religion. No religion is or can be wholly divine in the sense
of being altogether free of human mediation. Its origin and inspiration are divine but
human beings determine its meaning and content.
Id.
117. Id.
118. See ASAD, supra note 71, at 29 ("The theoretical search for an essence of religion invites
us to separate it conceptually from the domain of power.").
119. Castelli, supra note 113, at 6.
120. See ASAD, supra note 71.
121. See id. at 28 (writing that defining religion as distinct from law "is at once part of a
strategy (for secular liberals) of the confinement" of religion "and (for liberal Christians) of the
defense of religion").
122. Id. at 50 ("The separation of religion from science, common sense, aesthetics, politics,
and so on, allows [religious theorists] to defend it against charges of irrationality.").
123. Id. at 232.
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about the internal political dimensions of religion and that presumes
religion is imposed without internal contest or claims of right.
D. Cases in Point
The practical effect of law's view of religion is that law defers to
fundamentalist claims to discriminate in the name of religion or culture,
thwarting the claims of dissenting women and other advocates of change.
This is the case in both international and national law.
1. CEDA W (Global)
The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), which has been called the "International Bill of Rights for
Women,"' 124 offers a case in point. CEDAW is a wide-ranging,
comprehensive treaty covering civil, political, and cultural rights intending
to protect women in both their public and private lives.'25 To date, 170
countries have either ratified or acceded to CEDAW, the only major
international human rights instrument to address women's human rights
exclusively.126 On paper, CEDAW is a milestone achievement for women's
rights, going so far as to call on states to change customary, cultural, and
religious laws premised upon the inequality of the sexes.1
27
But thus far CEDAW's goals--especially with respect to the protection
of women in the private sphere-have been foiled. One of the most broadly
ratified conventions, CEDAW also has the dubious distinction of having the
highest number of reservations by the states party to it.'28 While the
reservations cover many issues, the most damning are those that reject
CEDAW's obligations where they interfere with religious or customary
124. Sheila Jayaprakash, The Right To Be Equal, HINDU, Apr. 23, 2000, at 4.
125. Most notable is CEDAW's Article 5(a), which provides:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:
To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or
on stereotyped roles for men and women ....
Women's Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(a), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17.
126. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2002), at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
127. See Women's Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(a), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 17.
128. See HENKN ET AL., supra note 31, at 362 (writing that as of April 1999, CEDAW "'has
attracted the greatest number of reservations with the potential to modify or exclude most, if not
all, of the terms of the treaty"' (quoting Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations
Regime and the Convention of Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 371
(1991))).
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laws. 129 These laws, such as many laws based on Shari'a, are particularly
regressive on women's issues. 3 0 When other signatory states complained to
the United Nations that the reservations based on religion, culture, and
custom violated international human rights law, which allows parties to
make reservations to treaties only if they do not undermine the "object and
purpose" of the treaty,' 3 1 they were cowed into silence by charges of
religious intolerance and cultural imperialism. 132 While the United Nations
has repeatedly called on parties to withdraw their reservations, 33 thus far
129. Many Middle Eastern and Islamic countries, for example, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq,
Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Maldives, and Morocco, took reservations to parts of
the Convention citing prejudice to Shari'a. United Nations, Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Reservations and Declarations, at http://www.un.org/
Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newsfiles/part-boo/iv boo/iv8.htm#J6G2eePatr (last visited Jan. 30,
2003) [hereinafter CEDAW Reservations and Declarations]. Other countries, including India,
Israel, and Singapore, took similar reservations on general freedom of religion grounds. Id. In
addition, a small number of countries, including India, Kuwait, Morocco, Niger, Singapore, and
Tunisia, expressed reservations based on customary laws and cultural mores. id. The effort to
subsume international human rights law under religious and customary law is not new. Many
Muslim states, for example, have long asserted a right to religious and cultural difference in
defiance of universal rights. The most symbolic of their statements is the 1990 Cairo Declaration
of Human Rights in Islam. Authored by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, this
document protests the universality of international human rights and declares that all human rights
are subsumed under the Islamic law of Shari'a. See Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,
U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., Agenda Item 11, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.157/PC/35 (1992).
130. See, e.g., An-Na'im, Human Rights, supra note 53, at 36-50 (finding inconsistencies
between Shari'a and international human rights standards, including in the area of women's rights,
but arguing that it is possible to reinterpret Shari'a to be consistent with international human rights
norms).
131. Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties "provides that a state
ratifying a treaty may make a reservation unless it is 'prohibited by the treaty' or 'is incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty.' Section 313 of the Restatement (Third), Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (1987), is to the same effect." STERNER & ALSTON, supra note
1, at 439 (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature, May 23,
1969, art. 19, S. EXEC. DOC. L, 92-1, at 16 (1971), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336-37). In general,
tolerance of reservations has been urged in order to achieve greater participation in the treaty and
to enable a state to protect its interests as much as possible. See id. at 441. Article 28(2) of the
Women's Convention also expressly prohibits reservations that contravene its "object and
purpose." Women's Convention, supra note 4, art. 28(2), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 23.
132. See Mayer, supra note 29, at 271 ("[A]ttempts to deter the practice of reservations in
conflict with the object and purpose of CEDAW have met with resistance in the form of
accusations that these were tantamount to Western attacks on Islam and/or the Third World."
(citation omitted)).
133. See REPORT OF THE FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, 130, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 177/20, U.N. Sales No. E.96.IV.13 (1995) (calling on states parties to CEDAW to
"consider withdrawing reservations... [and] ensure that no reservation is incompatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention or otherwise contrary to international treaty law"); Press
Release, Commission on Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights Takes Up Integration of
Human Rights of Women and Gender Perspective, U.N. Doc. HR/CN/909 (Apr. 13, 1999), at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990413.hrcn9O9.html (recommending that "all
Governments should ratify, without reservation, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women"). See generally General Recommendations Made by the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No.
4 (1987), at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recomm.htm (expressing concern in
1987 over reservations to CEDAW and suggesting "that all States parties concerned reconsider
such reservations with a view to withdrawing them").
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any changes made by Muslim countries (other than Turkey) resulting from
these efforts have been little more than semantic.' 34 The fact is, as Hilary
Charlesworth observes, that although the religion- and culture-based
reservations to CEDAW are likely invalid under international law, "there
are no satisfactory mechanisms in international law to challenge
reservations adequately."' 135 Human rights law's universal aspirations
notwithstanding, "implicitly, the U.N. acquiesced to the cultural relativist
position on women's rights."'1
3 6
But deference to religious leaders' arguments elides the claims of
women dissenters within these religious communities. In fact, many women
within the states parties making the religion- and custom-based reservations
oppose the reservations, and contest the religious interpretations on which
they are based. 137 These women argue that their governments-and the
international human rights community-have improperly deferred to
traditionalists and so-called cultural leaders' interpretations of private laws
without taking proper account of modernizing views.
2. Personal Laws (India)
India offers one of the most infamous examples in international law of
how political and legal systems together subordinate modem, egalitarian
religious views to traditional, patriarchal ones. In 1985, the Supreme Court
of India recognized the right of an elderly Muslim woman, Shah Bano, to
alimony from her divorcing husband based on section 125 of India's code
of criminal procedure.' 38 While many lower courts had similarly found a
right to alimony for Muslim women under this provision, 139 this case
sparked a firestorm of protest because the Hindu judge, C.J. Chandrachud,
expressly rejected the argument that Muslim personal law allowed a
husband to pay a divorcing wife any amount of his choosing for a period of
three months (iddat), this completely absolving him from further support
134. See CEDAW Reservations and Declarations, supra note 129. Among Muslim states
parties, only Turkey withdrew all reservations based on religion. See id.
135. Charlesworth, supra note 44, at 408-09 (noting that rejections of the reservations
themselves have been rejected as a form of religious intolerance).
136. Mayer, supra note 10, at 21-32.
137. See UNIFEM, Bringing Equality Home: Reservations (Nov. 2, 2002), at http://
www.unifem.undp.org/resources/cedaw/cedawlO.html (describing efforts of women's NGOs to
contest CEDAW reservations from within their states).
138. The Indian court held:
Under section 125 (1)(a), a person who, having sufficient means, neglects or refuses to
maintain his wife who is unable to maintain herself, can be asked by the Court to pay a
monthly maintenance to her at a rate not exceeding five hundred rupees.... "[W]ife"
includes a divorced woman who has not remarried.
THE SHAH BANO CONTROVERSY 25 (Asghar Ali Engineer ed., 1987) (quoting Khan v. Bano,
A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 945, 948).
139. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 47, at 172.
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thereafter. 140 Before Muslim women had time to celebrate, then-Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi, motivated by the fear of losing his Muslim male
supporters, quickly introduced legislation to overturn the decision. 141 The
resulting Muslim Women's Protection After Divorce Act of 1986142
"deprived all and only Muslim women of the right of maintenance
guaranteed under the Criminal Procedure Code.' 43
Muslim women expressed outrage, especially because the government
never sought input from the diverse Muslim community about the issue.
Standing on the steps of Parliament the day the Act was passed, one activist
asked, "If by making separate laws for Muslim women, you are trying to
say that we are not citizens of this country, then why don't you tell us
clearly and unequivocally that we should establish another country-not
Hindustan or Pakistan but Auratstan (women's land)?, 144 A watershed
decision, Shah Bano touched off activism worldwide; reformers used the
case to highlight the problem of state deference to oppressive religious
practices, and more importantly, the state's refusal to take into account the
varying religious perspectives within India's minority Muslim community.
Activists are bringing this critique to bear on questions of CEDAW
reservations and the reform of personal laws. Though the Indian
government ratified CEDAW in 1993, it did so with reservations regarding
social and cultural patterns, rights within the family, and rights relating to
marriage. 145 But now, a women's NGO, Women's Action Research and
Legal Action for Women (WARLAW), is "develop[ing] an innovative and
incisive legal challenge to force the [Indian] Government to take action on
its CEDAW commitments" and to revisit its reservations. 146 In particular,
WARLAW brought a petition to the Indian Supreme Court asking the court
to order the government to specify "how it intends to determine whether
communities want [their] personal laws changed' and how the government
"intends to include the voices of women from these communities when
140. See Bano, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. at 945. For a fuller account of the Shah Bano decision and
its aftermath, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 47, at 172-73 (reporting that the "Islamic clergy and the
Muslim Personal Law Board organized widespread protest against the ruling, claiming that it
violated their free exercise of religion"); and Martha C. Nussbaum, India: Implementing Sex
Equality Through Law, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 35, 44-47 (2001).
141. See, e.g., Edward A. Gargan, Hindu Rage Against Muslims Transforming Indian
Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1993, at A] ("Worried about Muslim support, Rajiv Gandhi had
the Parliament change the law to void the court's ruling."); Steven R. Weisman, Dispute over a
Moslem Divorce Ensnarls Gandhi, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1986, at A3 ("Politicians who have met
with Mr. Gandhi say he will probably support legislation to reverse the effects of the Shah Bano
decision. But feminists have served notice that if this happens, his party will 'forfeit its claim to
represent women,' as one leader put it.").
142. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act (1986), at
http://indiacode.nic.in/cgi/nph-bwegiUBASIS/indweb/allactretr/SF.
143. NUSSBAUM, supra note 47, at 173.
144. Nussbaum, supra note 140, at 45 (citation omitted).
145. See CEDAW Reservations and Declarations, supra note 129; UNIFEM, supra note 137.
146. UNIFEM, supra note 137.
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making this assessment."'147 While many women have lobbied for India to
abandon its personal laws altogether in favor of a Uniform Civil Code,'
48
still others, like the members of WARLAW, assert that what matters is that
the government take all constituents within a religious community into
account when ceding power to such communities.149 But thus far, just as
was the case in the Shah Bano controversy, the state has not acknowledged
women's efforts in this regard, and the personal laws have been left
intact. "'
3. Freedom of Religion and Tribal Sovereignty
(United States)
While the United States does not expressly delegate the governance of
private matters to various communities through personal or customary laws,
deference to religious or other private communities arises nonetheless in a
number of contexts. The associational speech and religious freedoms
guaranteed by the First Amendment offer one principal mechanism for
halting public intervention. In EEOC v. Catholic University of America,151
for example, Sister Elizabeth McDonough alleged sex discrimination and
retaliatory conduct in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
McDonough argued that she was denied tenure at Catholic University
because of her sex. But the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit dismissed the claim on the ground that its adjudication on the merits
would violate the First Amendment.' 52 Deferring to university authorities as
the arbiters of the organization's norms, the court upheld university leaders'
freedom of religion over the dissenting claim of Sister McDonough.
While it does not involve religion per se, tribal sovereignty for Native
Americans is yet another area in which U.S. law defers to traditionalists
within a culture over the claims of reformers. In Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez,153 a Pueblo woman and her daughter sought to apply the federal
Indian Civil Rights Act to challenge a tribal rule that granted tribal
membership to children of mixed marriages only when the father was
147. See id. (emphasis added).
148. See Padmaja A. Patil, Socio-Economic and Political Policies in the 1990s and Status of
Women in India, 19 J, THIRD WORLD STUD. 195, 199-201 (2002).
149. See Nussbaum, supra note 140, at 46 (writing that the adoption of a Uniform Civil Code
in India currently seems unlikely and that, in the meantime, "internal reform" of personal laws "is
the best option for the foreseeable future").
150. Proposed revisions to Christian personal laws dating back to the late nineteenth century,
for example, have languished in Parliament since 1994. See Shuma Raha, Women. The Right
Fight, STATESMAN, Jan. 27, 2001, at 2001 WL 4381562 (reporting that "even when a particular
community had been progressive enough to submerge their internal divisions and urge reforms,
the government... had baulked at implementing them").
151. 83 F.3d 455, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
152. Id.
153. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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Pueblo and not when the mother was Pueblo. 15
4 The U.S. Supreme Court
decided that it lacked jurisdiction to address the claim.
55 Describing the
Pueblo as a "distinct" 6  community-"a separate people"
1 57 -with
sovereignty over its internal affairs, the Court declined to intervene, so as to
protect the "tribe's ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically
distinct entity."'" Applying the traditional rationale for deference-not
wanting to impose the state's view on the tribe-the Court failed to
acknowledge that the tribe itself was conflicted. Ignoring the actual internal
diversity of views within the tribe (evidenced by the legal claim itself), the
Court deferred to tribal leaders at the expense of the Pueblo woman's effort
to seek equal justice for women within the tribe.'
59
4. Customary Laws (Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and South Africa)
In 1999, the landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in
Magaya v. Magaya160 shocked the international human rights world. In this
case, the eldest daughter of a deceased, polygamist man was denied rights
to her father's estate and ejected from the premises when a younger son
decided to claim ownership. The court based its decision on a provision of
Zimbabwe's intestacy code, which states:
"If any African who has contracted a marriage according to African
law or custom or who, being unmarried, is the offspring of parents
married according to African law or custom, dies intestate his estate
154. Id. at 51.
155. The U.S. Supreme Court decided that Congress, however oddly, had conferred certain
civil rights on tribal members, but had provided no means to enforce these federal rights in federal
court. Id.
156. Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
157. Id. (citations omitted).
158. Id. at 72; cf Lovelace v. Canada, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doe.
A/3640 (1981). In Lovelace, the Human Rights Committee, a body that monitors states parties'
compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, upheld the claim of
Sandra Lovelace, who was born and registered as a "Maliseet Indian" but who lost her tribal
membership and privileges under the Canadian Indian Act because she married a non-Indian man.
Id. The Committee held that the deprivation of Lovelace's Indian status--a deprivation that would
not have occurred if Lovelace were a man marrying a non-Indian woman-violated her rights
under article 27 of the Covenant, which states that "persons belonging to ... minorities shall not
be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture." Id. 13.2. The Committee further concluded that "to deny Sandra Lovelace the right to
reside on the reserve [does not seem] reasonable, or necessary to preserve the identity of the
tribe." Id. 17. Karen Knop reveals that the Canadian Indian Act incorrectly presumed that
traditional Maliseet culture was patrilineal. Indigenous women activists such as Lovelace
highlighted that, in fact, Maliseet culture was matrilineal and the Canadian Indian Act was a
colonial imposition of patriarchy. Knop argues that characterizations of the Lovelace decision as a
victory for all women's equality rights minimizes "Lovelace's claim about the cultural violence of
colonialism." KNOP, supra note 47, at 367.
159. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72.
160. 1999(1) Zim. L. Rep. 100.
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shall be administered and distributed according to the customs and
usages of the tribe or people to which he belonged."
16'
The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the "African law and
custom" of the father's tribe, which refuses to appoint a woman as heir to a
deceased father's estate when there is a living son.' 62 When the female
Magaya alleged a prima facie violation of the Zimbabwean Constitution's
guarantee of equality for women, the court held that the division between
customary law and civil law set forth in the Constitution exempts
customary law from constitutional scrutiny.
63
The case is only one of the most recent flashpoints on a continent that
has long debated the role of customary laws in its many countries. Another
battleground is post-apartheid South Africa. There, the Supreme Court of
Appeal recently held that women married under African customary law are
bereft of "all rights under a matrimonial property regime."164 Because of the
ruling, many "African women are [now] excluded from inheritance."
'1 65
Interestingly, critical appraisals of customary laws and their effect on
women's rights in South Africa have not called for the end of the personal
laws, but rather for more dynamic and progressive understandings of such
laws.' 66 Activists denounce the static understanding of such laws and the
legal system's "cultural relativism." 167 Reformers emphasize the need for
state legal systems to take into account evolving and contested
understandings of personal laws, just as is done for civil laws. Similar
efforts can be seen in Nigeria, 16 where Amina Lawal awaits the judgment
161. Id. at 103 (quoting Administration of Estates Act ch. 6:0 1, § 68(1)) (emphasis omitted);
see also David M. Bigge & Amlie von Briesen, Conflict in the Zimbabwean Courts: Women's
Rights and Indigenous Self-Determination in Magaya v. Magaya, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289
(2000) (analyzing the Magaya case).
162. Magaya, 1999(1) Zim. L. Rep. at 104.
163. Id. at. 105-06; see also Katherine Franke, Illegalized Sexual Dissent: Sexualities and
Nationalisms, in DISSENT IN DANGEROUS TIMES (Austin Sarat ed., forthcoming 2004)
(manuscript at 14-17, on file with author) (describing the political context for Zimbabwe's recent
regressive approach to women's rights, particularly with respect to land distribution).
164. Khadija Magardie, Ctr. for Socio-Legal Studies, Customary Law Threathens [sic]
Women's Rights, at http://www.csls.org.za/dw/art I 0jhtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).
165. Id.
166. See Penelope E. Andrews, Striking the Rock: Confronting Gender Equality in South
Africa, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 307 (1998) (advocating a balance between protecting indigenous
culture and women's rights); Elsje Bonthuys, Accommodating Gender, Race, Culture and
Religion: Outside Legal Subjectivity, 18 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 41, 55 (2002) (arguing for a
solution that avoids the "impossible choice" for women between conforming to civil law
standards or retaining "old forms of custom or religious law"); Martin Chanock, Law, State and
Culture: Thinking About "Customary Law" After Apartheid, in ACTA JURIDICA 1991, at 52, 67
(T.W. Bennett et al. eds., 1991) (arguing for an understanding of customary law as "tradition"
with a "future"-that is, as something that develops over time "without the exclusive control of
male elders and without state support for their interests").
167. Magardie, supra note 165.
168. In a joint statement by Baobab, a Nigerian women's rights organization that focuses on
women's legal rights under customary, statutory, and religious laws, and Amnesty International,
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of an appeals court about her sentence of stoning-to-death for adultery. In
these countries, organizations such as the Gender Research Project at the
Centre for Applied Legal Studies at Wits University in South Africa' 69 and
the International Human Rights Law Group in Nigeria17 are dedicated not
to abolishing customary laws but to making them just.
But these efforts are falling on deaf ears. Without a theory that
recognizes contest within cultural communities, and the possibility of
progressive change in the context of culture or religion, cultural dissent is
either ignored or affirmatively shut down.
In each of these cases, current law is lacking both procedurally and
substantively. Premised upon an outmoded conception of religion as
homogeneous and static, law presumes religious communities have a
uniform view and refuses to confront actual plurality and contestation
within a religious community. But as these examples, and the more in-depth
case studies in the next Part show, women are challenging law's
presumptions. All over the world, women are contesting traditional
customary and religious laws and demanding a right to participate in the
process of making religious or cultural meanings. Seen in this light, current
law is procedurally faulty because law does not recognize everyone equally
within the community as having a say in these processes. Perversely, law's
Enlightenment view of religion leads it to only recognize the claims of
fundamentalists and traditionalists, empowering these voices over those of
modernizers. Women's activism around the globe also challenges the
normative premise of current law, which accepts (and expects) imposed
identity and despotism within religion, so long as one has freedom in the
the organizations took no position on "the introduction and application of Shari'a law per se, as
long as it is carried out in full respect of international human rights standards, and in accordance
with the conventions of international law signed and ratified by Nigeria." See News Release,
Amnesty International, BAOBAB for Women's Human Rights and Amnesty International Joint
Statement on the Implementation of New Sharia-Based Penal Codes in Northern Nigeria (Mar. 25,
2002), at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/nigeriao3252002.htrnl; see also Michele
Landsberg, Muslim Feminist Focuses on Roots of Extremism, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 15, 2002,
2002 WL 103590078 (discussing Baobab's use of Islamic law to appeal cases such as Lawal's and
the organization's proposition that the strict interpretations of Shari'a currently being offered by
courts-such as the "strict isolation of women, flogging and stoning to death"--have not, in fact,
been part of Nigerian tradition).
169. CTR. FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, UNIV. OF WITWATERSRAND, GENDER RESEARCH
PROGRAMME 1999, at 1, at http://www.wits.ac.za/cals/gender/annual%2oreports/1999.pdf; see
also Ctr. for Applied Legal Studies, Univ. of Witwatersrand, Women and Customary Law
Reform, at http://www.kit.n/gcg/html/women-and-law reformprojects .asp (last visited Dec, 1,
2002).
170. Int'l Human Rights Law Group, IHRLG Women's Inheritance Rights in Africa
Initiative, at http://www hrlawgroup.org/initiatives/inheritance rights/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2002)
(describing efforts "to end unjust inheritance practices in Africa since 1998").
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public sphere. Departing from this traditional view, women are today
making normative demands for a right to freedom and equality within
religion, as well as in the public sphere. But current law ignores these
claims. Intent on actively defending the norms of the old Enlightenment,
today's law is obstructing the operation of the norms of the New
Enlightenment. Simply stated, yesterday's Enlightenment has become
today's New Sovereignty.
III. CONFRONTATION
But on the ground, women in the Muslim world are piercing the veil of
religious sovereignty. Far from reflecting a world in transition in which
formal laws (such as treaties and conventions) are imposed on individuals
at the grass-roots level, a close study of women activists in the Muslim
world demonstrates how they are confronting problems with formal laws
that often privilege the viewpoints and interests of traditionalists and
patriarchs. Rather than accepting the binary framework of religion (on
traditional leaders' terms) or rights (without normative community),
activists are developing strategies that enable women to claim both. Going
further, they are articulating new normative visions of women's human
rights that fundamentally challenge the Enlightenment premises of existing
laws. In contrast to the transition model, this confrontation brings to view a
far more dialogical model of interaction between formal human rights law
and informal human rights mechanisms; it suggests that strategic and
normative claims of "rights" on the ground may be ultimately distinct from
those articulated in formal law. Substantively, the dialogical model presents
new visions of law with which traditional law must reckon.
This Part presents two case studies that glimpse this dialogical model in
action. First, I highlight the human rights strategies of the transnational
network Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML). WLUML
exemplifies an operational human rights strategy that provides women the
option of articulating and demanding freedom and equality within the
context of a normative (i.e., religious and/or cultural) community. Next, I
offer a close reading of Claiming Our Rights: A Manual for Human Rights
Education in Muslim Societies, 71 published in 1998. The Manual, like
WLUML, identifies and employs strategies for allowing women access to
both equality and community. But the Manual perhaps goes further than
WLUML by identifying the core principles and theories undergirding its
strategy. Reading them together, I identify a conceptually coherent theme in
171. MAHNAZ AFKHAMI & HALEH VAZIRI, CLAIMING OUR RIGHTS: A MANUAL FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION IN MUSLIM SOCIETIES (1998). In this Article, I will refer to this
manual as "Claiming Our Rights" or "the Manual."
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the work of both WLUML and the Manual. Both herald what I characterize
as the rumblings of a New Enlightenment. As these case studies show,
activists on the front lines of the war against Muslim fundamentalism are
challenging old Enlightenment views that would leave religion and culture
as spheres of despotism, and are asserting instead rights to liberty and
equality within the private, as well as public, sphere.
A. Human Rights Networks:
Women Living Under Muslim Laws
Information-sharing and solidarity networks linking women worldwide
via computers, fax machines, and the Internet have been an important
source of community building17 2  and international lawmaking, 73
particularly in the Muslim context. 174 The work of WLUML offers a
powerful example. Seeking to facilitate women's human rights as
articulated in international instruments within Muslim communities or
countries, WLUML employs strategies that begin to bridge the gaps in
formal legal analysis that currently confound the realization of women's
rights in these contexts. In the process, WLUML's strategies suggest ways
of rethinking the formal law.
Founded in 1984, WLUML emerged as a response to rising
fundamentalism and identity politics in Algeria.'75 There, as elsewhere in
the Muslim world, women's autonomy was increasingly being threatened in
the name of "Islamic" laws and customs seeking to preserve a distinctive
way of life by heavily regulating women and their bodies, long thought of
as important sites for the articulation of community identity. 17
6
Rather than simply acquiescing to the claims of fundamentalists, or
pursuing women's human rights purely through secular strategies, as formal
human rights law would require, WLUML forged an alternate course. By
172. See Anupam Chander, Whose Republic?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479, 1493-95 (2002)
(describing how the Internet helps nurture transnational communities).
173. See generally ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2000) (describing the rise
of national, regional, and international women's "networks" as a mechanism for pursuing human
rights after the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Globalization, Accountability and the Future of Administrative Law: The
Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347 (2001) (noting the
expanding influence of "transgovernmental regulatory networks").
174. See Susan Sachs, Where Muslim Traditions Meet Modernity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2001, at BI (describing how the world's Muslim women are increasingly "confident of their
religious judgment and use the Internet as a forum to promote an alternative vision of the rights of
Muslim women").
175. See generally Int'l Women's Human Rights Law Clinic & WLUML, Shadow Report on
Algeria: To the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1999), at
http://www.nodo50.org/mujeresred/argelia-shadowreport.html.
176. See HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000); PARTHA CHA'rERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS (1993).
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networking, or sharing information with women around the world-
particularly women from other Muslim communities-WLUML sought to
contest the fundamentalist depictions of religious law emerging in Algeria.
To this end, WLUML collected information chronicling the existence of
alternative legal systems in Muslim communities that were far less
repressive-indeed, were progressive-on women's issues. The network
shared this information with Algerian activists, thereby contesting
fundamentalist depictions of monolithic "Muslim" laws. The network also
provided an important source of solidarity and support for activists, by
connecting Algerian women with other Muslims-not just Westerners-
who supported the Algerian women's claims for autonomy. Strategically,
this offered an important retort to fundamentalists who depicted women's
rights as "Western" and un-Islamic.
These strategies enabled Algerian women to pursue greater freedom
and equality, but without conceding their right to religion. Significantly,
WLUML's approach confronted not only fundamentalist understandings of
religion, but formal legal understandings, as well. WLUML challenged
traditional legal notions about who has the power to define religious
meaning and law's conception of the very nature of religion. To this day,
WLUML continues to identify many of the same problems impeding the
attainment of women's rights in Muslim communities as those that existed
back in 1984. And the network employs strategies to address these
problems that are very similar to those used in its earliest days.
1. Identity Problems
WLUML asserts that the most serious challenge to women's rights in
the Muslim world today is the imposition of identity by Muslim laws,
177
particularly the imposition of a religious identity on women.
178
Increasingly, laws in the name of Islam or characterized as "Muslim"
impose a singular-and, typically, conservative-view of religious identity
on women in Muslim communities. In a personal interview, Anissa Hlie,
director of WLUML's international coordination office in London, says that
characterizing laws and practices as religious is particularly challenging to
177. See ANISSA HtLIE, FEMINISM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD: LEADERSHIP INSTITUTES 31
(2000) (observing that "[flar from being innocent, this myth [of a homogeneous Muslim world]
limits women's and people's ability to evaluate what pertains to customs, law and religion and
therefore undermines their ability to assert their rights"); WLUML, Plan of Action-Dhaka
(1997), at http://www.wluml.org/english/publications/engpofa.htm [hereinafter Plan of Action]
(identifying the concept of one, homogeneous Muslim world as a myth and as one of the chief
factors undermining "women's ability to control change and re-invent [their] lives").
178. WLUML, LAWS, INITIATIVES IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 21 (1998) [hereinafter WOMEN,
LAWS, INITIATIVES] (expressing concern that many states are "promoting religious identity as the
primary identity").
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
14352003]
The Yale Law Journal
the realization of women's rights because the talismanic incantation of
religion insulates the claims from critique. Laws in Muslim communities
"are characterized as Islamic, divinely ordained, and something you
therefore can't challenge," H61ie says.' 79 Whereas secular laws are political
and contestable, religious laws are deemed fixed and immutable. Fueled by
the "myth of a homogeneous Muslim world," and made worse by women's
isolation and lack of knowledge about their rights, women and men are
made to believe that the fundamentalist view is the only way imaginable for
a woman unless she abandons her religion. 8 ° Coupled with this position is
the assertion-made by both fundamentalists and some cultural relativists
in the West-that human rights are a Western construct that are
incompatible with Islam.
WLUML notes that such identity politics affect women even in a
secular state because regardless of the formal governing laws, private
"Muslim" customs have a profound influence in shaping women's
possibilities.'18 Moreover, as Farida Shaheed, coordinator of WLUML's
regional coordination office for Asia has written, "whenever the
coexistence of multiple legal systems provides an option on the same issue,




But rather than advocate purely secular strategies for equality in the
public sphere without addressing growing inequality in the private (as the
traditional human rights approach would suggest), WLUML employs
strategies that contest fundamentalist depictions of identity. This approach
entails both critiquing the fundamentalist claims about women's religious
identity and empowering women to reshape religious identity in more
egalitarian terms.'
83
179. Interview with Anissa Hdlie, Author, in London, Eng. (July 11, 2002); see also
WLUML, International Coordination Office Flyer (on file with author) ("A major challenge lies
in the fact that, typically, in each community, this entire body of rules is characterised as
'Islamic,' justified as divinely-ordained, and constructed as immutable and unchallengeable. We
are therefore led to believe that the only way of 'being' is the one culturally imposed on us ....
180. Interview with Anissa H6lie, supra note 179.
181. "In most of the Muslim world, patriarchal customs-rather than state law-restrict
women's mobility, severely limit their access to public spaces, certain occupations, and
information, and deny women equal access to economic resources, health facilities, judicial
processes and to educational and job opportunities." WOMEN, LAWS, INITIATIVES, supra note
178, at 9; see also id. ("Customs can override formal legal or religious provisions .... ").
182. Shaheed, supra note 51, at 1000. For example, even where formal laws are secular, such
as in Turkey and Uzbekistan, customary practices refer to Islam. See WOMEN, LAWS,
INITIATIVES, supra note 178, at 12.
183. WLUML's foundational document, the 1986 Aramon Plan of Action, argues for
"focusing on the private as an area of enormous potential change." Cassandra Balchin, The
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WLUML's first strategy for undermining the fundamentalists' claims
involves highlighting the political and historical contingency of practices
thought to be essential to Islam. To this end, the network collects and
disseminates information about the actual diversity of laws and customs
throughout the Muslim world. 184 The network collects and circulates
information about progressive Muslim laws; makes Dossiers, or reproduced
academic articles on women and law, available in hard copy and on the
Internet; produces information kits, a news sheet, and special bulletins; and
disseminates Action Alerts (including over the Internet) on a regular basis,
which publicize urgent cases requiring immediate solidarity. The network
makes much of this information available in multiple languages. 85 In
addition, WLUML fosters "shared lived experiences through exchanges,"
promoting "face-to-face interaction between women from the Muslim
world who would normally not have a chance to travel and meet with
women from other, culturally diverse, Muslim societies." '186 These
exchanges help to break women's isolation and undermine the claims of
fundamentalists that there is just one way of being Muslim.'87
Sharing this information undercuts the claim that certain practices are
essential to religious belief. For example, WLUML's research shows that
practices such as female genital mutilation are not essential to Islam but,
rather, vary by time and location. Female genital mutilation has never even
existed in some Muslim communities, and in other communities the
practice is more popular among Christians than Muslims. Similarly,
exposing diversity in the areas of reproductive rights and family law has
also "enabled women to disentangle the complex threads of religion,
custom, and law." '188 As one writer observes, seeing the variety of Muslim
Network "Women Living Under Muslim Laws": Strengthening Local Struggles Through Cross-
Boundary Networking, 45 SOC'Y INT'L DEV. 128, 128 (2002).
184. Far from discovering any single way of being Muslim, WLUML's research has shown
that in fact Muslim women's lives
"range from being strictly closeted, isolated and voiceless within four walls, subjected
to public floggings and condemned to death for presumed adultery... and forcibly
given in marriage as a child, to situations where women have a far greater degree of
freedom of movement and interaction, the right to work, to participate in public affairs
and also exercise a far greater control over their own lives."
Shaheed, supra note 51, at 1007 (quoting WLUML, 1986 Aramon Plan of Action).
185. Id. at 1009.
186. Id. at 1010.
187. See id. at 1005. As Shaheed writes:
[C]ontacts and links with women from other parts of the Muslim world-whose very
existence speaks of the multiplicity of women's realities within the Muslim context-
provide an important source of inspiration [and]... give[] material shape to
alternatives. Both encourage women to dream of different realities-the first step in
changing the present one.
Id. at 1007.
188. Balchin, supra note 183, at 128.
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laws for themselves helps women "to distinguish between patriarchy and
religion."'89
Highlighting support for women's rights within the Muslim community
also offers a powerful tool to counter fundamentalist claims that feminism
and human rights are Western and un-Islamic. 90 In another effort to
empower women to reclaim feminism, in preparation for its Feminism in
the Muslim World Leadership Institutes,' 9 the network has collected and
shared historical examples of women's rights activism in the Muslim world
from the eighth to the twentieth centuries. "It was very important for
women from the community to claim feminists from their own culture, and
from their personal lives (stories about grandmothers, etc.)," H6lie
explains.192 "It's a tool," says Cassandra Balchin, assistant director of
WLUML's international coordination office in London. 93 In a personal
interview, Balchin continues, "[We are] giving women the tool to be able to
say that women's rights are part of your own culture."
1 94
Significantly, WLUML's anti-essentialist critique is aimed at both
fundamentalists and the liberal Left. For Marifm6 H61ie Lucas, the founder
and former international coordinator of WLUML, cultural relativism from
both sides of the political spectrum is "the big threat." "People from the
Left will say, 'Well, it's their culture. Who are we? Are we racists? We
can't interfere,"' says Hdlie Lucas in an interview.195 The problem with that
way of thinking, she says, is that "everything can be tolerated in the name
of culture. 196 A better approach, Hdlie Lucas urges, is to examine the
sources of cultural edicts, and to ask whose interests are being served or
disserved by them.'
97
H6lie Lucas recalls a case in which one's conception of religion made
all the difference. The case involved a divorce dispute in Britain between a
Pakistani woman and a Nigerian man. The couple met as students in Britain
189. Homa Hoodfar, Muslim Women on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century, WLUML
DOSSIER 21, Sept. 1998, at 7.
190. Shaheed writes:
The condemnation of any challenges to existing Muslim laws as rejections of Islamic
injunctions and the very concept of Muslim womanhood is a very potent formula for
maintaining the status quo, as it implicitly threatens challengers with ostracization....
Under these circumstances, questioning, rejecting, or reformulating Muslim laws is
indeed a major undertaking.
Id. at 1005.
191. The Feminism in the Muslim World Leadership Institutes took place in Turkey (1998)
and Nigeria (1999) and were organized in collaboration with the Center for Women's Global
Leadership.
192. Interview with Anissa Hdlie, supra note 179.
193. Interview with Cassandra Balchin, Author, in London, Eng. (July 11, 2002).
194. Id.
195. Interview with Mari~m6 Hdlie Lucas, Author, in Montpellier, Fr. (June 25, 2002).
196. Id.
197. Id. This is similar to exercises in the Claiming Our Rights manual. See infra Section
III.B.
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and eventually married and had a child there. Later, when the couple sought
to divorce, the husband asked the British judge for a divorce under Shari'a
law. When the judge appeared ready to defer to the man's version of the
divorce rules under Shari'a, advocates for the wife approached WLUML.
WLUML sent the judge examples of cases from all over the Muslim world
in which marriages were dissolved to the benefit of the woman. "[We were]
exposing someone who is a cultural relativist," H6lie Lucas says of the
judge. "He was prepared to divorce them in the name of Shari'a. But what
is Shari'a?... [W]hich one is the right one?"' 98
Today, this is an especially important issue in places such as Mali, the
Philippines, South Africa, and Palestine, where officials are considering
reform of personal, customary, and religious laws. The WLUML network
gives reformers in these communities information about alternative systems
of justice within Muslim frameworks that women may present for
consideration at home.' 99 Empowered by the network, women are claiming
a right to offer their own interpretations of religion and law and are
demanding that the state recognize their claims. "We have to ask who
defines culture," Hdlie Lucas says. "I want to define my own culture. Are
you going to deny me this right?"
20
Significantly, for Hdlie Lucas, the most notable change observed in the
network since it began deals with women's increasing autonomy to
challenge proffered religious interpretations and to offer their own
meanings instead. "It has changed insofar as women feel more and more
powerful to change both [religion and culture]," H6lie Lucas says. "I think
that's what comes out of nearly twenty years of work. They don't swallow




It is at this point that WLUML's innovative strategies start to look like
normative claims. According to Shaheed, WLUML posits that
it is only when women start assuming the right to define for
themselves the parameters of their own identity and stop accepting
unconditionally and without question what is presented to them as
the "correct" religion, the "correct" culture, or the "correct"
198. Interview with Maridmd Hdlic Lucas. supra note 195.
199. Balchin, supra note 183, at 127-28 (writing that personal law reformers around the
world "are using their linkages through WLUML to access alternative visions of justice for
women in family laws and strengthen their ability to promote this vision").
200. Interview with Maridmd H6lie Lucas, supra note 195.
201. Id.
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national identity that they will be able effectively to challenge the
corpus of laws imposed on them.20 2
The network writes, "The essential issue is who has the power to define
what women's identities should be.... It is time to challenge-both
politically as well as personally-those who define what the identity of
women should be as Muslims." 20 3 WLUML calls upon women to "create
[their] own identity" by, among other things,
* asking [themselves] and analyzing who is imposing
new dress codes on [them] and why;
* breaking the male monopoly of religious
interpretations ... ;
• and, most importantly, by functioning as alternative
legitimising reference points for each other.
20 4
In short, WLUML demands that women enjoy a right to challenge and to
create normative community-that is, a right to make the world. This claim
challenges not only the fundamentalists' view of religion, but law's view as
well. As Hlie Lucas says, paradoxically, both "want a homogeneous view
of Muslim laws."20 5 Thus, WLUML holds individuals accountable for not
taking women's cultural and religious interpretations into account when
deferring to traditionalist interpretations of personal, religious, or customary
laws. For example, in its third Plan of Action written in Dhaka in 1997,
WLUML directly confronts the "progressive media" for "fall[ing] into the
trap of cultural relativism,"20 6 writing that "[ijn the name of the right to
difference, they are prepared to support any practice, be it totally unjust and
against the common understanding of human rights, if so-called 'authentic
leaders' of the community justify it by reference to culture or religion." The
Plan of Action condemns the media for giving "a platform to
fundamentalists as the sole representatives of Muslims.
20 7
202. Shaheed, supra note 51, at 1008.
203. WOMEN, LAWS, INITIATIVES, supra note 178, at 24 (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 46.
205. Interview with Maridmd Hlie Lucas, supra note 195.
206. Plan of Action, supra note 177.
207. Id. (emphasis added). WLUML also criticizes "human rights groups," which it claims
"perhaps unintentionally.., help build the legitimacy of fundamentalist groups. Because their
mandate is primarily to focus on the violations of human rights by the state, human rights groups
focus on violations committed against fundamentalists such as arbitrary arrest and illegal
detention, torture and absence of fair trials." Id. at 6. While WLUML concedes the importance of
such work, it contends that "the extreme imbalance between the representation of violations
committed by the state and by fundamentalists in recent human rights reports creates de facto
support for fundamentalists." Id.
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WLUML emphasizes that far from being homogeneous and fixed,
religion and culture are and ought to be plural, contested, and constantly
evolving to meet the changing needs and demands of modem individuals.
Thus, WLUML's work within the framework of religion and culture does
not limit itself to reading Islamic texts or discovering fundamental truths
and essences. 20 8 Rather, the network understands religion and community as
historical-hence, changing with cultural changes-and based on
individual autonomy-that is, as emerging from the definitions that
individual members themselves forge. WLUML empowers individual
women to take part in the process of defining their religious community and
identity based on historically evolving needs and aspirations, reason, and
exchange of information with people inside and outside the Muslim world.
4. WL UML's Challenge to Human Rights Law
WLUML's identity strategies and evolving norms reveal the deficiency
of the strategies and choices offered by traditional human rights law. While
traditional human rights law is content not to challenge despotism in the
private, religious and cultural sphere-indeed, it more often defends
despotic religious practices-WLUML is confronting injustice within the
contexts of religion and culture. WLUML's approach is in part strategic:
The network recognizes that religious claims are particularly hard to
challenge, and therefore expends effort to deconstruct religious claims as, in
part, contingent and political. Perhaps more importantly, WLUML
recognizes that many women will resist rights if they are only possible
outside the context of religious and cultural community. Thus, it pursues
strategies that would reconcile religion and rights, making it possible for
women to have both.
But WLUML's proclamation of a right to contest and create culture
also presents a normative challenge to traditional legal understandings of
rights, and freedom itself. The organization suggests that normative,
religious, and cultural experience may be so important that it requires more
208. Reformers characterize a purely textualist approach as too limited. "We can show that
what the Prophet said was a step forward" on a particular issue, such as slavery or women's rights,
Hdlie Lucas says. Interview with Maridm6 H6lie Lucas, supra note 195. "But we cannot limit
ourselves to that. If the Prophet says 'beat your wife lightly,' or 'be kind to your slave,' a religious
approach would limit itself to these" instructions. Id. "Maybe within reinterpretation people can
go further than that. But a secular approach would be no slavery" under any circumstances. Id. In
addition, few Muslim women have the expertise or credentials to challenge traditional Islamic
interpretations. "If you are talking about reinterpretations, there the problem is historical-that
women have historically been excluded from interpretation, and they therefore lack the capacity in
terms of knowledge of Arabic, knowledge of jurisprudence, admission into colleges that teach
theology, etc.," says Balchin. Interview with Cassandra Balchin, supra note 193. "It's very
difficult if you don't know Classical Arabic. It's difficult if you don't have the legitimacy of
education at certain places." Id.
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substantive rights within these spheres than are currently recognized by
formal law. Under current law, individuals would have a right to exit a
discriminatory community in pursuit of equality in the public sphere. But
WLUML's strategies suggest that exit rights, without more, would deprive
women of the fundamentally important right to religious community. At the
same time, WLUML's work suggests that a meaningful right to religious or
cultural community requires that individuals have a right to participate in
the shaping of the community because community without equality or
freedom within it is also insufficient. In short, WLUML's strategies
articulate a right to more democratic culture.
It is important to note that WLUML's innovative, culture- and religion-
based approaches to women's human rights do not reject wholesale
traditional, secular human rights approaches. Nor does WLUML pursue the
culture- and religion-based strategies exclusively. To be sure, WLUML also
employs purely secular strategies for pursuing women's human rights and
many WLUML activists identify themselves as secularists. 20 9 Staying tuned
to what strategies work best in particular contexts, WLUML activists
emphasize that "these are choices, not destiny. ' '2' But as Hdlie Lucas
points out, many observers try to confine the network to its "work from
within." 211 "Whenever we do a religious interpretation [project] it's really
easy to get funding," Hlie Lucas says, and "it's usually what we are asked
to speak about. There are all sorts of indications that this is what we should
be-indigenous. ,212 For example, some outsiders incorrectly see all of the
209. Hdlie contrasts the network with the U.S.-based Catholics for a Free Choice, with which
WLUML collaborates regularly. Interview with Anissa Hdlie, supra note 179. The difference
between the two groups, H6lie says, is that the members of Catholics for a Free Choice are mostly
believers, which is not the case in the Network. While many women linked to WLUML are
indeed bclievers in Islam, there are also many people who choose a secular approach (although
they may also be believers), and there are those who are not believers but still, because they were
born and raised in a Muslim community, are assumed to be "Muslim women" to whom Muslim
laws are applied. Id.
210. WLUML, Introduction, WLUML DOSSIER 23/24, July 2001, at 3; see also M.A. Hdeie
Lucas, What Is Your Tribe?: Women's Struggles and the Construction of Muslimness, WLUML
DOSSIER 23/24, July 2001, at 49, 59 ("What is of most interest to me is the fact that amongst
different but complementary strategies [of Muslim feminists], only one is artificially isolated,
getting most attention, most funding, most recognition. It is seen as the only authentic one, the
best for 'Muslims.' Indeed, it is the strategy of religious interpretation."); Shahrzad Mojab, The
Politics of Theorizing "Islamic Fundamentalism ": Implications for International Feminist
Movements, WLUML DOSSIER 23/24, July 2001, at 64, 71 (critiquing the myth of the "Muslim
woman" whose identity is determined singly by religion); Farida Shaheed, Constructing
Identities-Culture, Women's Agency and the Muslim World, WLUML DOSSIER 23/24, July
2001, at 33, 34 (expressing concern that preoccupation with religiously based reform efforts by
Muslim women at the expense of recognizing multiple strategies, including the secular, "over-
determines the role of Islam in the lives of women," and implies that "Muslims somehow manage
to live in a world that is defined solely by a religious identity, is exclusive of all non-Muslims and
that is insulated from any other social political or culturally relevant influences such as structures
of power, the technological revolution, the culture of consumerism, etc.").
211. Interview with Maridmd H6lie Lucas, supra note 195.
212. Id.
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group's activities "as reinterpreting the Qur'an," H61ie Lucas explains.
"They essentialize us." 213 Of course, there is essentializing from the other
side as well. While some view WLUML as primarily religious, "in other
214countries we are labeled atheists," H61ie Lucas muses.
To be sure, many WLUML networkers hold secular, universal views of
women's rights. At the same time, observing the dialogical relationship
between traditional understandings of formal secular law, and its
implementation and interpretation on the ground by networkers, we can
also see that WLUML's emerging strategies and norms may be ultimately
distinct from those articulated in traditional human rights law. Unlike some
of their Western counterparts, who might be quicker to equate being secular
with being antireligious, WLUML recognizes that to claim their rights,
women must be able to influence the content of religion and culture.
Indeed, WLUML contends that even in a secular state, the private spheres
of family, culture, and religion, and not the public sphere alone, profoundly
influence women's lives and opportunities. In order to have more freedom
in all aspects of their lives, WLUML innovatively suggests, women need to
be actively involved in critiquing, contesting, and remaking culture.
Emerging from WLUML's confrontation with traditional human rights law
is a new legal claim: Women must have a right to create their culture on
their own terms.
B. Human Rights Manuals-Claiming Our Rights
Human rights training manuals are yet another neglected source of
international law. At first glance, these manuals appear merely a useful tool
for helping to communicate with women on the ground about their rights in
international law, or for training the trainers-that is, teaching human rights
activists from groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International how to conduct consciousness-raising' 15 sessions with women
in local communities worldwide. But on closer inspection, we see that
human rights training manuals, like WLUML, play an important role in
remaking legal strategies and theories. In fact, the manuals may go even
further than networks such as WLUML, in that they are explicitly
articulating theories of women's human rights, and developing and testing
creative strategic programs to implement these theories. In this sense,
studying the normative theories and strategies underlying such manuals
offers another view of how rights on the ground are evolving differently
from law in theory.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. On consciousness raising as a feminist strategy for change generally, see CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 83-105 (1989).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 1443
The Yale Law Journal
This Section studies Claiming Our Rights: A Manual for Women's
Human Rights Education in Muslim Societies,2 16 an ambitious, first-of-its-
kind manual designed to foster women's human rights at the grass-roots
level in Muslim communities. Claiming Our Rights-first published in
1996 217 -diverges from prior manuals in significant ways. Cowritten for
the Sisterhood Is Global Institute (SIGI) by Mahnaz Afkhami and Haleh
Vaziri, Claiming Our Rights sought to address specific problems that
scholars and activists identified as impeding women's human rights in the
Muslim world.218 First, reformers were concerned that a lack of local and
cultural texts and stories to help convey the abstract rights expressed in
international legal documents would make the translation of women's
human rights concepts to local Muslim communities difficult. Second,
reformers had no theory or strategy to respond to claims by religious
fundamentalists-and some Western cultural relativists-that secular,
universal human rights are "Western" and thus incompatible with an
Islamic or Muslim way of life. Third, and perhaps most importantly,
without a mechanism for reconciling human rights and being Muslim,
reformers found themselves only able to make rights arguments in secular
terms, completely relinquishing the terms of cultural and religious identity
to patriarchs.
Thus, the Manual's goals were both strategic and normative.
Strategically, Claiming Our Rights sought to facilitate the transmission of
international human rights law to local Muslim communities, while
216. AFKHAMI & VAZIRI, supra note 171. The Manual, which was first published in 1996,
has since been translated and adapted for use in countries as diverse as Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,
Egypt, India, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Syria, the United States, and Uzbekistan.
As of 1998, nearly 2000 women and men were estimated to have participated in the Manual's
pilot workshops. See id. at iii.
217. See Barbara Crossette, A Manual on Rights of Women Under Islam, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 1996, at A4 (announcing the Manual's historic publication "with the shadow of a repressive
Islamic regime in Afghanistan hovering over the debate" on women's human rights in the Muslim
world).
218. See generally KUMARI JAYAWARDENA, FEMINISM AND NATIONALISM IN THE THIRD
WORLD 2 (1986) (observing that feminism was "not imposed on the Third World by the West"
and detailing a far more complex history of feminism in the Third World); FATIMA MERNISSI,
BEYOND THE VEIL: MALE-FEMALE DYNAMICS IN MODERN MUSLIM SOCIETY 169 (Ind. Univ.
Press 1987) (1975) (describing acquisition of greater rights by women in Muslim communities as
"a random, non-planned, non-systematic phenomenon, due mainly to the disintegration of the
traditional system under pressures from within and without"); VALENTINE M. MOGHADAM,
MODERNIZING WOMEN: GENDER AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1993) (noting that
Islamist feminist movements simultaneously seek to maintain authentic cultural traditions and
institutions while selectively incorporating from the West to advance women's rights); WOMEN,
ISLAM AND THE STATE (Deniz Kandiyoti ed., 1991) (highlighting the role of state building in the
development of feminisms in Muslim societies); Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Under Western Eyes:
Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses, in THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF
FEMINISM 51, 51 (Chandra Talpade Mohanty et al. eds., 1991) (positioning "the intellectual and
political construction of 'third world feminisms' at the crossroads of two simultaneous projects:
one of deconstructing hegemonic Western feminist discourses and another of constructing
historically, geographically, and culturally grounded feminisms).
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effectively answering the claim that universal rights are not relevant to
Muslim women. Normatively, the Manual would challenge the supposed
incompatibility of religion and rights.
The result is a manual that, unlike traditional human rights law,
reconceives rights as also relevant in religious and cultural spheres, not just
in the public sphere. Arranged into twelve workshop sessions revolving
around hypothetical scenarios that highlight the human rights articulated
during the Fourth World Conference on Women convened in Beijing,
China, in September 1995,219 the Manual employs several strategies that I
label as translation, textualism, constructivism, and reconstructivism.
Translation involves collecting stories, texts, idioms, folklore, and other
examples from local cultural and religious life to help translate abstract
international human rights laws to women on the ground. Textualism-the
collection and presentation of specific religious and cultural texts that help
explain and support the rights articulated in international law-is part and
parcel of the translation effort. Viewed by themselves, the translation and
textualism strategies-to the extent the Manual relies on texts supportive of
women's rights and international law-appear to affirm the law's transition
thesis. Religious and cultural texts are used strategically and functionally to
help deploy secular, universal human rights at the grass roots. The universal
rights themselves remain unchallenged.
But viewed in conjunction with two other strategies-constructivism
and reconstructivism-the Manual begins to look more like a confrontation
with traditional international law than an easy transition to it. The Manual's
textualism does not rely purely on texts that support women's rights-let's
call these "good texts" -but also includes religious and cultural texts that
challenge the rights expressed in international law. Faced with these "bad
texts," women participants are not asked to choose either religion or rights
in cases of conflict, but rather, are encouraged to discuss the texts and to
critique them. Religious texts are revealed as, in part, human constructions
that are historically contingent and biased. This is the constructivist mode.
Revealing some religious truths as partial, women are empowered to
reconstruct religious and cultural norms in ways that reflect modem,
international human rights principles and women's own current needs and
aspirations.
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1. Translation
Initially, Claiming Our Rights simply seeks to translate, or "use
indigenous ideas, concepts, myths, and idioms to explain the rights
contained in international documents" to Muslim women at the grass-roots
level. 220 For years, Muslim activists and scholars worried that the lack of
culturally relevant language to convey to Muslim women the message of
international human rights documents was a major impediment to the
propagation of the concepts and to expansion of women's human rights in
Muslim societies. 221 At a meeting in Berlin in May 1995, representatives
from sixteen Muslim countries meeting to discuss strategies for improving
women's human rights in their regions concluded that "the production of
material using indigenous concepts and ideas to support international rights
documents" was a project of "highest priority."
' 2
True to this goal, Claiming Our Rights presents excerpts from several
leading human rights instruments-including the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948),223 the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (1966),224 the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1966),225 and the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) 226-in dialogue with
supporting texts from Muslim communities, such as the sura of the
Qur'an;227 samples of hadith concerning women; 2 8 examples of women
role models, some from among Muhammad's wives and daughters;229 and
samples of Arabic proverbs concerning women3
The cultural and religious examples are offered to help explain abstract
international rights in a local language.231 The notion of "equality," for
220. Id. at 1 (discussing the need to find indigenous concepts and ideas "to support"
international rights documents).
221. Id. ("The idea of a human rights education project for women in Muslim societies
originated during a series of meetings, discussions, and conferences held and sponsored by SIGI
since 1993.").
222. Id.
223. Id. at 85-89.
224. Id. at 91-99.
225. Id. at 101-15.
226. Id. at 117-27.
227. The sura are passages from the Qur 'an. Id. at 53-73.
228. Id. at 75-78. The Manual describes hadith as "the term applied to the reports of the
Prophet Muhammad's words and actions." Id. at 75. Hadith were first recorded by the Prophet's
companions orally and later translated into writing. Because of the human intervention involved in
writing the hadith, the authenticity of many of them-of which there are thousands-remains a
subject of disagreement among Islamic scholars. Id.
229. Id. at 79-81.
230. Id. at 83-84.
231. The Manual does not limit the use of cultural examples in training sessions to those
examples it supplies. Instead, Manual facilitators are requested to "make a point of collecting
cultural materials-proverbs, quotes from literary works, biographies of role models, and/or
newspaper clippings" found in the cultural settings in which they are teaching. Id. at 13.
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example, is engaged in the very first workshop session through reflection
on a hadith from the Prophet Muhammad, which states that "[a]ll people
are equal, as equal as the teeth of a comb. 232 Women consider the meaning
of equality through discussion of the Prophet's recorded statement that
"[t]here is no claim of merit of an Arab over a non-Arab, or of a white over
a black person, or of a male over a female. 233
2. Textualism
In order to translate international rights to local communities, the
Manual relies heavily on texts from religious and cultural sources that
support women's rights-my so-called "good texts." On the issue of
domestic violence, for example, the Manual offers a verse from the Qur'an
that states that "[i]f a wife fears cruelty or desertion on her husband's part,
there is no blame on them if they arrange an amicable settlement between
themselves. 234 On the subject of the freedom of religion, the Manual
quotes the Qur'an as stating, "[1]et there be no compulsion in religion.
' 235
"Good texts" help women relate to international human rights. At the same
time, "good texts" respond to claims by fundamentalists and cultural
relativists that universal human rights are foreign to Muslim religion and
culture. "Good texts" demonstrate to women that their human rights are
"supported by their cultural traditions. '236
Without more, the Manual's strategies of translation and textualism do
not represent anything new in human rights theory. In both instances,
culture is engaged pragmatically, accommodating women's religious
beliefs, but ultimately only in the service of helping women to learn their
universal human rights.
But the Manual's textualism also includes "bad texts"--that is, texts
that might be read as more hostile, or equivocal, with respect to women's
equality and autonomy. In a session on women's right to choose whom to
marry, for example, the Manual juxtaposes international legal text stating
that "[m]arriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of
the intending spouses, 23 7 with conflicting religious texts. One verse from
the Qur'an states, "We have enjoined upon man (to be good) to his
parents," asking women to think about their obligations to obey elders; yet
another verse states that believers "enjoin what is just, and forbid what is
evil," suggesting, perhaps, that women ought to do what is right for them.
2 38
232. Id. at 16.
233. id.
234. id. at 27.
235. Id. at 39.
236. Letter from Sisterhood Is Global Institute to author (Jan. 29, 1997) (on file with author).
237. AFKHAMI & VAZIRI, supra note 171, at 19.
238. id.
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Women are encouraged to discuss the issue in light of these multiple texts.
In an exercise on veiling, the Manual offers a verse from the Qur'an stating
that men should be modest before God by lowering their gaze, but that
modest women should "draw their veils over their bosoms and not display
their beauty except to their husbands" and other members of their family.
23 9
Facilitators then ask women whether these injunctions require different
obligations of women and men, and who decides how women dress. 240 In
both of these examples, texts are used not merely to translate rights, but
also to encourage women to weigh and judge the texts themselves.
3. Constructivism
It is in this critical textualist approach that the Manual begins to look
like something new. By encouraging women to question religious texts, the
Manual challenges the traditional legal conception of religion as natural and
incontestable. To the contrary, one of the "major premises" of the Manual is
that many religious texts are historically contingent and subject to human
bias.24 ' For example, the Manual characterizes the "shari'a-the rules
which have governed Muslim societies throughout the centuries," as
"historically determined and temporally situated because it has had to be
rendered understandable to each age and community by reference to the
needs of that age and community. ' '242 The Manual states that the Shari'a
laws, which were written by men, may be flawed and politically biased.
"Because human society has been organized hierarchically and patriarchally
across the ages, the shari 'a, like all other religiously inspired laws, reflects
the social realities specific to that age," the Manual states.243
The constructivist strategy emphasizes not only the contestability of
religious laws and interpretations, but also their multiplicity and flexibility.
"The interpreters of the Qur'an... have been able to offer different
interpretations during different epochs precisely because the original
'Word' is infinite in depth and scope," the Manual states.2 44 "Hence, it is
applicable to innumerable circumstances and is able to define evolving
conditions infinitely.
" 245
239. Id. at 23.
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4. Reconstructivism
Revealing that religion is in part a human construction is a first step in
enabling women to question and critique religious laws. But the Manual
goes further. It also empowers women to reconstruct religion. Through
twelve workshops, the Manual uses hypotheticals, role playing, and
storytelling to enable women to construct a dialogue and negotiate, rather
than avoid, the tensions between Muslim traditions, international human
rights concepts, and evolving notions of gender equality. 246 In its own
words, the Manual examines not the conflict but the "relationship between a
woman's basic human rights and her culture." 247 Under this approach,
rights are not imposed from outside or above a community, but rather are
derived from the process of women negotiating conflicts within the
community.
In short, women's human rights emerge, or are reconstructed, through
dialogue and participation-both within one's cultural community and
ultimately in the legal world of international human rights itself. The
cultural basis for human rights in Muslim communities under the
reconstructivist method, then, is not just proverbs and quotations from
religious texts, but the workshop participants themselves. The Manual self-
consciously seeks to help "individuals become participants in defining the
relevance and validity of ideas regardless of their source or age," stating
that "[t]he appropriate function of a human rights education model,
therefore, is to promote 'rights' by facilitating individuals' participation in
the definition of law or truth. 2 48 It is only when women "reclaim their own
cultures, interpreting texts and traditions in self-empowering ways ....
[that] women may truly claim their rights. 249
Thus, the Manual is a tool not just for teaching knowledge, but for
empowering action-that is, for empowering women to construct new
cultural, religious, and legal knowledge. Practical exercises prepare and
empower women for the political activity of rejecting imposed norms and,
246. See, e.g., id. at 27-29 (presenting a hypothetical conversation between Leila and her
friend Zahra, who has just been raped); id. at 33-35 (describing the dilemma of Ayda, a top
student who is denied permission to take a science class because of her gender); id. at 36-37
(presenting a hypothetical in which Fatima, a medical student, discovers she is being paid less
than half of what a male medical student is being paid for the same work in a local doctor's
office). There is an interesting coincidence of method here with the approach of some critical race
scholars, who also rely upon dialogue and narrative to promote rights consciousness. See, e.g.,
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO
CHRONICLES (1995).
247. AFKHAMI & VAZIRI, supra note 171, at 12.
248. Id. at 4. Rather than aiming at incontrovertible truths, it produces dialogical frames
where "ideas can be freely discussed and analyzed," the Manual states of its methodology. Id.; see
also id. at 5 (explaining that the model "does not aim to teach a particular truth but rather to
establish dialogue"); id. at 12 ("[Tlhis manual does not seek to impart truth.").
249. Id. at 9.
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in turn, creating their own truths and meanings. Throughout the Manual,
exercises focus on encouraging women to speak their conscience and to
express themselves freely, "without self- or other kinds of censorship,, 250 in
a variety of settings, public and private. In a session on women's rights and
responsibilities within the family, for example, participants are asked to
consider how they interact with male members of their family. 2 5 By asking
the women when was the last time they asked a male relative for something,
and how they broached the subject, 252 the exercise encourages women to
share both frustrations experienced in communicating with male family
members and strategies for successful communication. Participants discuss
a hypothetical conflict between a daughter, Leila, and her father over the
choice of whom to marry.253 Leila is not averse to the man her father has
chosen for her, but would like the opportunity to get to know him before
finalizing the arrangement. The young man, Karim, has no objection, but
Leila's father does. Participants are asked to consider Leila's rights and
obligations, and how Leila may successfully present her views to her father.
Another exercise encourages women to discuss family planning with
their husbands. In this hypothetical, Leila, now married to Karim, wants to
use contraception but Karim is afraid of community stigma.2 54 The Manual
facilitates the discussion with an excerpt from CEDAW articulating
women's right to "decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing
of their children" and a verse from the Qur'an stating that with respect to
parenting, "[n]o soul shall have a burden laid on it greater than it can
bear.",25 5 Participants are asked to "consider what aspects of [their] cultural
and religious experiences support women's rights within the family.
2 56
Later, the Manual directly addresses women's rights to challenge
religious authorities. In an exercise entitled "Learning Your Faith," the
Manual seeks to "underscore the relationship between how and by whom
Islam is taught, and what is learned, to suggest that women are capable of
understanding Islam and may do so differently than men, and to explore




Women are asked whether "both women and men" are "capable of reading
and understanding the Qur'an and hadith," and "[i]f women interpreted the
Qur'an, would they emphasize different issues than those that men have
250. Id. at 40.
251. Id. at 17-18.
252. Id. at 17.
253. Id. at 18-19.
254. Id. at 21-22.
255. Id. at 22-23.
256. Id. at 19.
257. Id. at 35.
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stressed? ' 258 The Manual asks, "If you were a religious expert in your
community what aspects of Islam would you emphasize?"25 9
The penultimate exercise has the leading characters from the
hypotheticals-Leila, Karim, and friends-now organizing and leading a
demonstration at the local university, to protest the university's attempt to
silence a friend, Huda, who has written controversial poetry about her
experience with domestic violence.26 ° Participants are asked, "Should
women organize around a common cause? Should women lead their
communities? Have you ever organized and/or led a group to pursue a
common goal? ' 261 The final session asks women, "How is the promotion of
women's basic human rights a community project? '262 In addition to
encouraging dialogue, several exercises throughout the Manual encourage
women to draft model laws that better address women's issues. Women are
asked, for example, to "write a law" addressing the crime of violence
against women. 63 After discussing their experience in coming to consensus
on this project, women are asked what role they may play "in writing and/or
strengthening the laws against various forms of violence?
264
5. Rumblings of a New Enlightenment
It is through this reconstructivist approach-to both religion and law-
that Claiming Our Rights charters new ground. Unlike traditional
conceptions of human rights, the Manual envisions-and fosters-a notion
of democracy within culture, not just outside of it.2 65 Here we can hear the
rumblings of a New Enlightenment: The Manual questions traditional
assumptions that rights, reason, and autonomous participation and speech
belong purely in the public realm. "The operative concepts here are identity
and authenticity in a context of freedom and equality," the Manual states.
2 66
An interview with one of the Manual's coauthors reveals more about
the cultural and political context within which the Manual seeks to
intervene. Mahnaz Afkhami explains that this radical new approach to
thinking about religion and rights emerged out of Muslim feminists'
frustrations with traditional conceptions of women's human rights.267 On
the one hand, she recalls, Muslim reformers were frustrated with the claims
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 44-46.
261. Id. at 46.
262. Id. at 49.
263 Id. at 29.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 5 (describing the Manual as "geared to ideas, structures, and actions that enhance
democracy and promote civil society").
266. Id. at 6.
267. Telephone Interview with Mahnaz Afkhami, Author (Aug. 1, 2002).
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of fundamentalists and cultural relativists, who held that human rights are
Western or foreign. "I have traveled all over the Muslim world and I've
never heard anybody say that we don't want [a right] because it's a Western
right," says Afidhami, an international women's rights activist for almost
thirty years. "[T]he right to choice-no one opposes that."
268
On the other hand, Afkhami says that reformers began to resent the
traditional notion that religion and rights do not mix. "During my own work
with women's groups in Iran in the 70s we had a hands off relationship with
religion," Afkhami recalls. "We did not engage because we were presented
with the option that either you believed in rights or you believed in your
religion and there was just no way of doing both., 26 9 But later reformers
began to challenge this dichotomy, asserting that choosing rights over
religion was an extreme sacrifice many women were being forced to
make. 270 As Afkhami tells it, this changing consciousness coincided with
shifts due to modernization and globalization. Over time, she contends,
women-both those on the ground and those in activist and leadership
positions-felt more empowered to question traditional religious and legal
rules. "As traditional societies change, people become more conscious of
individual rights," Afkhami says. "At one point, the law was the given that
everybody accepted and people just had to obey what was given. Now we
are moving toward rights. We are moving from law to rights."
271
In other words, modernizing societies-including Muslim societies-
are moving away from accepting law or imposed identities toward a new
era that posits an individual's right to construct identity and conceptions of
rights on one's own terms. The Manual's reconstructivist approach is
premised on this notion: Individuals are not taught "truths" written in
international law, but rather are empowered to construct their own version
of the truth-be it in a cultural, religious, or public context. "The essential
part of the methodology is the consciousness that you don't dictate to
people, by either religious edicts or human rights edicts," Afkhami says.
You let people discuss it for themselves and come to conclusions
for themselves. It's striving for a new way of learning that
emphasizes the individual as an empowered being who can decide
for herself. It connects again to the idea that that person also
decides how she sees her religion and how she sees the relationship
between various rights and her religion.27
268. Id.
269. Id.; see also IN THE SHADOW OF ISLAM: THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN IRAN (Azar
Tabari & Nahid Yeganeh eds., 1982).
270. Telephone Interview with Mahnaz Afkhami, supra note 267.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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For Afkhami, the Manual's engagement with religion does not make it
antisecular. In fact, Afkhami believes that "[s]ecularism is at the heart of
human rights" because women should not have any identity-let alone a
religious identity-imposed upon them. 273 But some Western feminists "go
beyond this by not accepting that people have a right to be religious,"
Afihami says. The Manual, in contrast, asserts that women "have a right to
their own spirituality, their own exercise of religion." Afkhami continues
that "sometimes feminists have had a way of not valuing the adherence of a
lot of other feminists to religion. That's something that has caused a bit of
difficulty in solidarity building. 2 74
Significantly, while Claiming Our Rights confronts human rights law, it
does not reject it. Rather, it takes human rights claims and makes them
applicable in more aspects of women's lives-that is, in private as well as
public contexts. Afkhami says of the Manual,
It's radical... because it is a new way of going the furthest that
one can in allowing people to make choices and to have
autonomous definitions of their identity, both spiritual and
otherwise.... It allows people-for many, many millions for the
first time-to think that it is possible to relate to God directly, to
relate to culture directly, and to make their own sense of what it
means.
275
Indeed, this is a "radical" new conception of human rights. While
traditional legal understandings of the "right to religion" favor leaders'
views of the religion over those of dissenters and actively affirm the right of
leaders to impose their views on members, the Manual views freedom of
religion and choice as an individual right to participate in the group and to
shape one's own religion-not just as an individual right to belong or to
leave. "You talk about the right to exercising your religion, but the nuance
of here's an individual woman wanting to say what her religion means to
her and not wanting to comply with what some mullah says it is" has been
less theorized, Afkami says. Claiming Our Rights allows the religious
authority "the right to his interpretation, but he just simply does not have
the right to tell me to change my interpretation," Afidiami continues,
acknowledging that in this way the Manual heralds "a new way of
extending, expanding, and communicating the actual practice of the right to
religion.
27 6
To be sure, like WLUML, the Manual does not advocate a culture- or
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testing the Manual in various countries have found that religious
approaches are more appealing in some countries and less so in others.277
For example, in her home country, Iran; where theocracy has been in place
for more than twenty years, Afkhami says that religious approaches are not
popular. "There [women] resist religion and they want to deal more with
[international] conventions and material like that," she says. "In general, the
population in Iran since the revolution has become more and more secular.
Not in terms of the government but in terms of the civil society. So in
different settings, different aspects of the [Manual] have been stressed.,
278
In Afghanistan, on the other hand, many reformers have found that some
engagement with culture and religion is necessary. 79
The Manual's open framework has led to its appropriation by numerous
groups around the world. According to Afichami, Claiming Our Rights has
thus far been translated into twelve languages and has been further
"reevaluated and readjusted as it has been produced and implemented in
different countries., 280  "The methodology and the Manual is totally
flexible," Afkhami says, so that "[p]eople are making new versions of the
Manual all the time. There is not only a Jordanian version of it, but there
are many Jordanian versions of it.
' 281
Where the Manual itself has not been adapted, its approach has been.
282
Even traditional human rights manuals that at one time took a purely
277. See SISTERHOOD Is GLOBAL INSTITUTE ANNUAL REPORT 2000 (offering detailed
country reports from field tests of the Manual in Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Jordan,
Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, and Uzbekistan).
278. Telephone Interview with Mahnaz Afkhami, supra note 267.
279. June Starr's work on Islamic justice in Turkey suggests a dialectical relationship
between secular and religious law. According to Starr, religious campaigns become popular after
periods of secularization; and, vice versa, secular campaigns have more resonance after theocratic
moments. See JUNE STARR, LAW AS METAPHOR 176 (1992) (writing that the comeback of
religious sentiments within otherwise secular campaigns for legal reform in the Islamic context
does not represent a problematic aberration in the secular legal project, but "merely another swing
in the pendulum toward more complexity in the dialogue").
280. AFKHAMI & VAZIRI, supra note 171, at 9.
281. Telephone Interview with Mahnaz Afkhami, supra note 267.
282. A review of other country-specific manuals for women's human rights suggests that the
cultural approach is used by a number of women's human rights groups. See, e.g., ZEINAB
ABBAS, HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION FOR WOMEN: AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE (n.d.) (asking
Sudanese women to discuss religious and cultural tenets that both contradict and support women's
human rights); MANISHA GUNASEKARA, DRAFT TRAINING MANUAL ON WOMEN'S HUMAN
RIGHTS EDUCATION 86 (1995) (encouraging women to "recast" traditional folklore and religious
texts "from a constructive feminist optic" and calling forth a "radical reinterpretation of
tradition"); LILA-PILIPINA, WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION: A TRAINING MANUAL 9
(1995) (urging Filipino women at the grass roots to reconceive international human rights, and
recognizing the limitations of international treaties "vis-A-vis religion, ethnicity, neocolonialism,
class stratification[,] ... racism and other patriarchal ideologies of power"); cf B.A.B.E.:
WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP, TRAINING ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS (1995)
(using culture for educational, but not necessarily nationalist, purposes); MEGHNA
GUHATHAKURTA & KHADUA LINA, EMPOWERiNG WOMEN AT THE GRASSROOTS: A MANUAL
FOR WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION (1995) (taking a more secular approach that focuses
on increasing women's political participation in hopes of securing a Uniform Family Code that
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"secular" approach 283 have begun to highlight some of the themes in
Claiming Our Rights. A popular human rights education manual called
Local Action, Global Change: Learning About the Human Rights of Women
and Girls,'14 written by human rights educators Julie Mertus, Nancy
Flowers, and Mallika Dutt, is an example. While early drafts of Local
Action, Global Change took a traditional universal approach to women's
human rights that spent little time on questions of religious or cultural
community,28 5 the current version questions the efficacy of a purely secular
approach in securing women's rights. 286 In the context of the family, for
example, Local Action, Global Change notes the use of religious arguments
to prevent secular legal reforms, which are effectively characterized as
foreign and "counter to religious law and custom.
2 8 7
Taking a reconstructivist approach similar to Claiming Our Rights, the
manual states that it may be "necessary to create an enlightened religious
interpretation of different religions, since it is the right of all people to
believe."2 88 An exercise entitled "Analyzing Culture" asks participants to
list religious and cultural practices in their lives that are different for
women and men. Participants are asked, "Who is imposing the practice?"
and "Who is benefiting from the practice?" Under this new approach,
women are not asked whether human rights should trump religious laws,
but rather, whether it is possible to find "interpretations of culture and
religion that are not oppressive to any group of people. 2 89 The manual asks
women how they would "go about promoting those interpretations. ' ' 90
Finally, rather than view human rights as fixed in positive international
human rights law, the revised manual calls human rights "dynamic and
evolutionary. Documents such as CEDAW "are the fundamental
documents for giving women some idea of existing international
standards." But the manual continues that
will end misuse of religion and governance of family relations by Islamic personal law). Many of
these manuals were sponsored and partially funded by the People's Decade for Human Rights
Education, a United Nations project.
283. Interview with Nancy Flowers, Author and Human Rights Educator, Amnesty
International, in Stanford, Cal. (Oct. 29, 1997).
284. See JULIE MERTUS ET AL., LOCAL ACTION, GLOBAL CHANGE: LEARNING ABOUT THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND GIRLS (1999).
285. In fact, a pre-Beijing version sought to help women transcend parochial identifications
and embrace their global identity as women. Julie Mertus et al., Our Human Rights: A Manual for
Women's Human Rights (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
286. The Manual also directly quotes many contemporary human rights activists in the
Muslim world. See, e.g., MERTUS ET AL., supra note 284, at 41 (quoting Nawal El Saadawi and
Farida Shareed); id. at 41-42 (citing reports of the 1994 WLUML conference in Lahore, Pakistan).
287. ld. at41.
288. Id. (quoting Nawal El Saadawi, Fundamentalism-a Universal Phenomenon, WLUML
DOSSIER 9/10, Dec. 1991, at 30) (emphasis added).
289. Id. at 29.
290. id.
291. Id. at 206.
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these documents should not be presented as "perfect" or "settled."
Women should be encouraged to examine and question everything.
The facilitator may point out that women's participation and gender
perspective in the drafting and enforcement of international
documents has been far from perfect. Moreover, not all groups of
women have been addressed. Participants should consider how
these documents might have been different if all women's concerns
had been represented and respected.292
This review of contemporary women's human rights training manuals
reveals that traditional understandings about the "universality" of human
rights are changing. During the last century universality was consonant with
a notion of positive law that is external to communities and that either
trumps local culture or takes a backseat to it. Recent editions of Claiming
Our Rights and other contemporary human rights education manuals
suggest, however, that evolving notions of human rights are derived both
from within cultures, in response to their needs and evolving values, and in
dialogue between reformers on the ground and formal human rights
instruments.
293
But how are formal law and legal institutions responding to this
dialogue? Perhaps more important still, how should they respond? I turn to
these questions in the next Part. Here I conclude by summing up the new
normative conception of rights emerging on the ground through Muslim
women's activism. Feminist analysis emerging in Muslim communities
does more than offer an anti-essentialist critique showing that Islam is
diverse. Feminists assert that Islam ought to be diverse. Feminists working
in Muslim communities assert women's rights to contest imposed identities
and to create plural and autonomous normative visions of culture and
religion. Articulating a new right to make one's own identity, they
fundamentally challenge current legal constructions of religion and culture.
While current law conceives of individuals as having the freedom to pick
and choose between communities, but allocates the right to define the
community to religious and cultural leaders, women in Muslim
communities are asserting that individual members of a community ought
to be able to participate in this process.
292. Id. at 205-06.
293. Sally Engle Merry makes a similar observation in a recent article describing three
different approaches to gender violence in a small Hawaiian town. Merry observes that the three
approaches--one based on rights, one based on religion, and one based on indigenous
community-were strikingly different in how they defined and dealt with gender relations. At the
same time, Merry notes that all three approaches shared "similar technologies of the self' through
free will and choice. Merry's point is that local communities reflect "modem" conceptions of the
self as autonomous and rational, while imagining just societies that are not necessarily secular or
universal. Sally Engle Merry, Rights, Religion, and Community: Approaches to Violence Against
Women in the Context of Globalization, 35 LAW & SOC'Y 39, 40 (2001).
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Herein lies an important contribution to theorizing women's
international human rights. Feminists in Muslim communities are boldly
taking the critique of the public/private dichotomy beyond freedom from
violence to freedom to create normative community. Under this view, while
women should have a right to exit a normative community and choose
another one if they want to, they should also have a right to stay within their
communities and reform them. Current law's focus on exit elides many
women's desire to maintain religious and cultural community. At the same
time, a right to culture is not enough if women have no right to participate
in making the culture. For women to assert cultural and religious rights
requires a reconception of culture and religion as spaces that allow for
reasoned, autonomous, and democratic participation. It is in this sense that
the rights-based claims of feminists working in Muslim communities are
distinct from traditional, Western human rights claims. Whereas the old
Enlightenment sought freedom and equality in the public sphere alone,
feminists in Muslim communities herald the New Enlightenment,
demanding autonomy and democracy in both public and private spheres.
IV. FuTuREs
"Imaginations of socially just futures for humans usually take the idea
of single, homogenous, and secular historical time for granted,"
Chakrabarty writes.294 But in presuming that the world's peoples are
marching in lockstep toward a singular future,295 we elide alternatives and
blind ourselves to incisive critiques of current law and of liberalism
itself.296 Viewed as confrontation rather than as transition, the claims of
women reformers in Muslim communities offer important new takes on
traditional law and its attendant notions of cultural relativism,
multiculturalism, imposed identity, and narratives of transition. This Part
highlights these contributions by offering the normative critiques of
reformers working in Muslim communities as a theoretical road map for
piercing the veil of the New Sovereignty. More broadly, it highlights their
contributions in the hopes of illuminating the importance of shifting from
294. CHAKRABARTY, supra note 58, at 15.
295. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Erewhon: The Coming Global Legal Order, 37 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 347, 355-56 (2001) (describing "the spread of U.S. law and U.S. lawyering abroad" as, in
part, "a matter of taste, like the spread of Coca-Cola" and explaining that "[i]t is perhaps also
sheer convenience and the fact that Americans were in the field fairly early, and because their
style of lawycring suits the needs of the international order").
296. See Bhikhu Parekh, A Varied Moral World, BOSTON REV., Oct.-Nov. 1997, at
http://bostonreview.mit.edu/br22.5/parekh.html (observing "an increasing tendency among liberals
to equate 'liberalism' and the good" and lamenting that this "prevents us from asking if liberal
principles are good and, conversely, if nonliberal principles might also be good").
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an impositional to a dialogical approach in our study of law and
development.
The last Section in this Part shifts from theory to practice. Returning to
the grave human rights problems with which this Article began-the plight
of Amina Lawal and others suffering under the despotism of
fundamentalism in religious law and culture-I consider what strategies,
procedures, and prescriptions law should adopt to better address such cases.
A. Piercing the Veil of the New Sovereignty
Read one way, campaigns for women's rights in Muslim communities
suggest a swift victory for the universality of human rights. Rejecting
culturally relativist arguments that cultural groups ought to be let alone and
allowed to continue their discriminatory ways, more and more of the
world's women assert-in the words of the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Radhika Coomaraswamy-that
"[c]ultural diversity should be celebrated only if those enjoying their
cultural attributes are doing so voluntarily."297 Challenging the essentialist
theory that Islam and the West are clashing civilizations that share no
fundamentals, 298 the rights-based efforts of women in the Muslim world
provide persuasive evidence that liberty and democracy have a truly
universal appeal.299 And thus far, this is the way they have been understood.
Thomas M. Franck's impressive history of the transition from
communitarianism to individualism by "societies everywhere-in Western
297. Radhika Coomaraswarny, Reinventing International Law: Women's Rights as Human
Rights in International Community, in DEBATING HUMAN RIGHTS: CRITICAL ESSAYS FROM THE
UNITED STATES AND ASIA 167, 181 (Peter van Ness ed., 1999).
298. Harvard's Samuel P. Huntington has led this crusade. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON,
THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF THE WORLD ORDER (1996), Samuel P.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 22, 40 ("Western idcas
of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law,
democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in
Islamic ... cultures."). Ernest Gellner's significant work on Islamic legal orders takes a view
similar to Huntington's. See, e.g., ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY
AND ITS RIVALS 28-29 (1994) (describing Islam as "an absolute moral community" that, in
contrast with Civil Society, lacks individualism, intellectual pluralism, and a variety of political
institutions and associations); ERNEST GELLNER, POSTMODERNISM, REASON AND RELIGION
(1992) (explaining the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and critiquing postmodem relativism).
299. JOEL BEININ & JOE STORK, On the Modernity, Historical Specificity, and International
Context of Political Islam, in POLITICAL ISLAM 3, 21 (Joel Beinin & Joe Stork eds., 1997)
(arguing that "the 'clash of civilizations' thesis... invokes an essentialist, ahistorical culturalism"
and that "Islam, like all cultural systems, is a contested field of meaning"); Amartya Sen, A World
Not Neatly Divided, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001, at A39 (criticizing a "clashing civilizations" view
of Islam and the West, which imagines uniformity within cultures and stark differences across
cultures, and arguing that such a view robs us "of our plural identities" and "impoverishes the
world"). On "Orientalism," or the West's view of Islam as "other," see EDWARD SAID, THE
EDWARD SAID READER 171 (Moustafa Bayoumi & Andrew Rubin eds., 2000).
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and non-Western societies" 300-gains much legitimacy from observing that
activists from the Third World "have taken the lead in insisting that human
rights are not a set of imposed western ideas, but are of universal
application, speaking to the human condition., 301 Franck even quotes
Claiming Our Rights for its proposition that human rights are universal and
not in conflict with Islam. 
°2
In another recent book, Martha C. Nussbaum similarly concludes after
years of field studies on women's rights movements in India and other
developing countries 3 that "no argument has yet shown that there is any
human being who does not desire choice." 30 4 The result of such
characterizations is the quick conclusion that "the answer" to modernity,
the world over, is "democracy, stupid. 3 °5 And democracy as we know it in
the West, to be specific. Nussbaum, for example, has concluded that "[a]ny
universalism that has a chance to be persuasive in the modem world
must... be a form of political liberalism. 30 6 After September 1 th, even
Salman Rushdie joined the chorus, arguing that "the world of Islam must
take on the secular-humanist principles on which the modem is based. 30 7
Such claims reflect a familiar story about the production and reception
of legal consciousness, in which the West is the primary site of legal
production-exporting such goodies as secularism and the "rule of law"-
and the Third World is the happy receptor of such knowledge and
structures.
But read another way, claims for women's human rights in Muslim
communities signify much more than a world "in transition." To be sure,
women from Muslim countries and communities embrace the universal
concepts of justice, equality, and democracy. But unlike traditional Western
lawyers, they seek to apply these concepts within explicitly religious and
cultural contexts, not in the public sphere alone. Feminists in Muslim
300. FRANCK, supra note 34, at 148.
301. Id. (quoting Rosalyn Higgins, Ten Years on the Human Rights Committee, 6 EUR. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 570, 575 (1996)). Franck quotes Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, who characterizes "the idea that different societies and cultures view fundamental human
rights differently" as "truly demeaning. of the yearning for human dignity that resides in every
African heart." Id.
302. See id. at 120.
303. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 9 (1999) ("The universals defended
here are the fruit of many years of collaborative international work.").
304. Id. at 11.
305. Thomas L. Friedman, Today's News Quiz, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at A 19 (writing
that the key to the future of Arab-Muslim states is "democracy, stupid!"); cf Amy Chua, Markets,
Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1
(1998) (complicating evolutionary theories of democratization and marketization in the context of
market-dominant ethnic minorities).
306. NUSSBAUM, supra note 303, at 9.
307. Salman Rushdie, Editorial, Yes, This Is About Islam, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2001, at A25
(arguing that Muslim nations must restore religion to the personal, rather than the political, sphere
"in order to become modem").
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
20031 1459
The Yale Law Journal
communities argue that the same democratic principles that guide the public
sphere should apply within the family, culture, and religion-that is, in
spheres traditionally defined by Western law as private and virtually
unregulated. This is a radical shift from traditional human rights law, which
posits freedom only in secular terms.
The transition narrative explains away these differences. Muslim
women's claims are hailed for their affirmation of rights and universality,
0 8
while differences are characterized as strategic cultural accommodations or
worse-as nostalgic, 30 9 self-defensive, 310 and "disingenuous" 3' '-that is, as
signs of "incomplete transition" 312 or failed "legal transplants. '" 313 The
cultural accommodation view 314 understands the engagement of women in
Muslim communities with culture and religion as strategic and necessary in
the "shadow 315 of fundamentalism, but without normative value. In this
view, religious discourse is just a means to an end, with true justice arising
when the transition to secular rights-that is, a proper division between
public and private-is complete. Presuming that religion is inherently a
sphere of injustice, the transition narrative misses the new normative claim
that religion ought to be just.
Characterizing claims for rights within religion as mere cultural
accommodations also indigenizes the claims, confining their relevance to
local, not global, contexts. When I presented early drafts of this paper, the
308. As subaltern studies scholars describe, historicism reduces the reform efforts of Third
World actors to mere mimicry of the West. See HoMi BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 86
(1994) (defining "colonial mimicry" as "the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a
subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite").
309. See CHAKRABARTY, supra note 58, at 27 (acknowledging that his identity-based thesis
leaves him "open to the charge of nativism, nationalism--or worse, the sin of sins, nostalgia").
310. Gellner describes cultural arguments as reflecting a tendency to self-defensiveness
among Muslim apologists, which ultimately creates the anomaly of "a modem science-based
culture with native idioms." JOHN HUTCHINSON, THE DYNAMICS OF CULTURAL NATIONALISM 32
(1987).
311. One law professor characterized feminist readings of the Qur'an this way during a
presentation of some of the ideas in this Article.
312. CHAKRABARTY, supra note 58, at 3 1.
313. See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW (1974). For more critical explications of the "transplant" hypothesis in law-and-development
scholarship, see Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of "Legal Transplants," 4 MAASTRICHT J.
EuR. & COmp. L. 122 (1997) (critiquing the "transplant" thesis as betraying "apolitical decision
to marginalize difference and correlatively to extol sameness"); and David Kennedy, The Politics
and Methods of Comparative Law 13 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(describing differences under the transplant hypothesis as arising from "[f]ailed transplant efforts,
indigenous reactions against transplantation [and] intentional or accidental misreadings of
transplanted material"). Both Kennedy and Legrand note that "legal transplant" analysis is used
more often to explain similarities than differences in legal reform efforts.
314. See Legrand, supra note 313, at 122 (describing the "transplant" thesis as conceiving of
culture as an "irrational interloper" that interferes with the implementation of "objective" legal
rules); Kennedy, supra note 313, at 17 (writing that "[s]imilarities between legal phenomenon in
different locations . . . tend to be allocated to economic stages or functional necessities, while
differences tend to be allocated to cultures").
315. Crossette, supra note 217.
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first reaction of the audience members was that this strategy is well and
good for Muslim women who have to confront religion ("They live in
theocratic states!"), but that it offers little help to Western women. This
view obscures the struggle with fundamentalism at home. In fact, the
United States is in the company of Afghanistan in refusing to ratify
CEDAW.316 While conservatives in the United States have openly
expressed their concern about the "radical" nature of CEDAW, which
"threatens" American family values, 317  American commentators
nonetheless argue that the United States should ratify the Convention in
order to help women in the Third World, not at home. 3 18 Convinced that the
real threat to women's rights is elsewhere, 319 many refuse to confront
Muslim women's New Enlightenment claims. The implication is that
enlightenment in the public sphere was good enough in the eighteenth
century, and remains so in the twenty-first century as well.
But far from speaking narrowly to indigenous needs alone, women's
human rights claims emerging in the Muslim world present a powerful
normative critique of the New Sovereignty in international and national
law. Denouncing law for conceding power to patriarchal leaders of private
groups without engaging the diversity of views within cultural
communities, 320 activists highlight the role of the state in authorizing
traditional views of religion over the claims of dissenting women. We can
learn more from this claim than simply its anti-essentialist critique. Seeing
316. See United Nations, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Signatures and Ratifications, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/
englishintemetbible/partI/chapterlV/treatylO.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
317. See James Dao, Senate Panel Approves Treaty Banning Bias Against Women, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 2002, at A3 (noting that conservatives fear the treaty will be used to impose a
feminist agenda on issues ranging from abortion rights to employment quotas); Katha Pollitt,
Ashcrofi Loves Iran, NATION, July 8, 2002, at 10 (describing Attorney General John Ashcroft's
distaste for CEDAW and reiterating Jesse Helms's statement in 2000 calling CEDAW "a terrible
treaty negotiated by radical feminists with the intent of enshrining their anti-family agenda into
international law").
318. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Bush vs. Women, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2002, at A17 (claiming
that CEDAW "would make no difference in America but would be one more tool to help women
in countries where discrimination means death"); Nicholas D. Kristof, Women's Rights: Why
Not?, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at A23 (writing that "frankly, the treaty has almost nothing to
do with American women, who already enjoy the rights the treaty supports" and arguing that
"[ilnstead, it has everything to do with the half of the globe where to be female is to be persecuted
until, often, death").
319. See Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181 (2001)
(arguing that Western feminist obsession with the problems of immigrant and Third World
women obscures violence and discrimination against women in the West).
320. See Clara Connolly & Pragna Patel, Women Who Walk on Water: Working Across
"Race" in Women Against Fundamentalism, in WOMEN, GENDER, RELIGION: A READER, supra
note 112, at 447, 447, 461 (critiquing what they call the "classic multicultural, noninterventionist
style" emerging in British jurisprudence, and explaining that the activist group Women Against
Fundamentalism "rejects the politics of what has come to be known in Britain as
'multiculturalism' that delivers women's futures into the hands of fundamentalist 'community
leaders' by seeing these as representatives of the community as a whole").
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how the New Sovereignty has arisen in response to the New Enlightenment
illustrates how, in a globalizing world witnessing fragmentation and
change, law itself has become an important tool for forcefully preserving
traditional communities. Simply put, "[i]n the modem day, insularity does
not come naturally. Those who seek it must fight for it."'321 Currently, legal
norms such as cultural relativism and multiculturalism buttress the power of
traditionalists over modernizers. Because law conceives of religion in
fundamentalist terms, religious communities are continually being remade
to reflect fundamentalist views.
It matters how law conceives culture and religion. Current legal
conceptions of culture and religion view both as static and homogeneous,
and make no conceptual space for internal change.32 2 In contrast, reformers
in the Muslim world suggest that in the twenty-first century, we need a
normative theory of cultural change that allows individuals a way of
imagining autonomous and egalitarian lives outside the secular,
bureaucratic freedom of traditional liberalism. The fear is that without a
discourse that allows women to choose freedom within a context of faith,
reactionary impulses will win out over progressive ones. That is, as
freedom and the future become associated only with the bureaucratic West,
many in the Muslim world seek to maintain their religious identity in what
appears to be the only place remaining-the past.
323
In contrast, reformers with a dynamic and historically contingent
understanding of religion question the authenticity of "traditional" laws,
which are often the products of either internal power politics or colonialism.
Indian principalities, for example, generally had uniform laws governing all
aspects of life until British rule. The British established separate "personal
laws" governing family life and property inheritance for each religious
community, while creating a national system of commercial and criminal
321. Sunder, supra note 33, at 501.
322. For some recent, thoughtful attempts to retheorize multiculturalism, see JACOB T. LEVY,
THE MULTICULTURALISM OF FEAR 52 (2000) (arguing for a new understanding of
multiculturalism that offers "no cultural shield to protect violent and cruel internal practices");
AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN'S
RIGHTS 5-8 (2001) (arguing for "joint governance" of cultural communities between local leaders
and the state in order to protect internal minorities' rights, particularly the rights of women); and
Iris Marion Young, Two Concepts of Self-Determination, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCEPTS,
CONTESTS, CONTINGENCIES, supra note 56, at 25 (arguing for a revised understanding of self-
determination from noninterference to nondomination, whereby minorities may enjoy a separate
existence so long as there is no internal domination). On cultural relativism, see SATYA P.
MOHANTY, LITERARY THEORY AND THE CLAIMS OF HISTORY: POSTMODERNISM, OBJECTIVITY,
AND MULTICULTURAL POLITICS (1997).
323. See M.H.A. Reisman, Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Impact on International Law and
Politics, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 44, at 357, 364 ("The future was
hopelessly penetrated by non-Islamic elements, while the past remained pure. To maintain their
identity, Moslem leaders became backward-looking.").
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law.3 24  Thus, postcolonial studies belie traditional notions of
noninterference on which cultural relativism and multiculturalism are
based. As Lila Abu-Lughod writes, "[I]t is too late not to interfere. The
forms of lives we find around the world are already products of long
histories of interactions." '325
Today, both Western feminism and religious fundamentalism are
competing to define women's identity-the former as secular and free, the
latter on religious leaders' terms.326 But as I have sought to show, women
increasingly reject these options, choosing a third way that seeks identity on
more enlightened terms. This activism suggests that the central question of
the new century will not be individualism or identity, but rather who has the
power to define identity.327 Despite increasing skepticism in the academy
about the possibilities for freedom within identity, 32 8 women's human rights
reformers in Muslim communities are not rejecting identity, but calling for
the right to reconstruct it.
32 9
In short, advocacy for women's rights in the Muslim world signals a
fundamental change in the conception of identity itself. While traditional
human rights to identity presume that identity will be imposed within
groups (albeit freely chosen from among groups), the activists I have
highlighted here seek to expand choice within identity groups. This claim
presupposes not only that identity groups are internally plural, but that they
324. See Nussbaum, supra note 140, at 40 (explaining that the current "decentralized
situation dates back to the Raj, when the British codified commercial and criminal law for the
nation as a whole, but, in the spirit of divide and rule, encouraged the maintenance of separate
spheres of civil law in non-commercial areas"); see also KNOP, supra note 47, at 364 (describing
how indigenous women in Canada revealed that the Canadian Indian Act codified "not indigenous
customs" as claimed, "but European patriarchy").
325. Abu-Lughod, supra note 19, at 786-87.
326. See Minoo Moallem, Transnationalism, Feminism, and Fundamentalism, in WOMEN,
GENDER, RELIGION: A READER, supra note 112, at 119, 120 ("Feminisms and fundamentalisms
are now competing global forces, both attempting to find means to control the mechanism of
cultural representation.").
327. As Cornel West writes:
The crucial intellectual battles of the day.., are no longer over Truth but rather over
the production of truths-and this truth-production is a fully historical and political
affair. That is, we do not passively accept the Truth from a static past, but rather we
contribute to the creation of new truths by reinterpreting old truths of dynamic
traditions in light of new circumstances and challenges.
Cornel West, Faith, Struggle, andReality, 45 CHRISTIANITY & CRISIS 400, 401 (1985).
328. See, e.g., PAUL GILROY, AGAINST RACE: IMAGINING POLITICAL CULTURE BEYOND THE
COLOR LINE (2000); K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies
and Social Reproduction, in MULTICULTURALISM 149, 162-63 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) (asking
whether, if we take autonomy seriously, identity does not replace "one kind of tyranny with
another"); Janet E. Halley, Culture Constrains, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?,
supra note 9, at 100, 103-04.
329. In this sense women's strategies reflect the view of West, who writes that identity
politics, "on the one hand, are inescapable and, on the other hand, still too limited." CORNEL
WEST, Christian Love and Heterosexism, in THE CORNEL WEST READER, supra note 90, at 401,
407.
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should be, in order to allow individuals more room to negotiate their
membership in the group-from the traditional end of the spectrum to the
radical.330
Finally, although a transition narrative would explain women's
religion-based claims as a remnant of the past, Muslim women's claims are
a far cry from nostalgic. Critically engaging religion, reformers on the
ground are taking seriously the claims and desires of modem peoples and,
in so doing, offer the possibility for futures in which freedom may be
imagined both within and without faith.3 ' What is more, campaigns for
human rights in Muslim communities challenge the linear, evolutionary
view of law and history implicit in transition narratives. Presenting a more
contextual, contingent, and dynamic model of legal history, campaigns for
women's human rights in Muslim communities illustrate an ongoing
process resembling what Reva Siegel describes as "preservation-through-
transformation."332 In this view, the legal system does not merely function
in the service of "rights" and "justice," but rather, is continually coopted by
status quo interests against change. 3 In the present context, law attempts to
create a sphere of enlightenment in the public realm, but fundamentalists
and traditionalists take advantage of this liberal compromise, asking law to
define more of life's activities as belonging to the private domain. The
reformers in Muslim communities that this Article highlights are boldly
confronting the traditional transition theories of law and religion that have
made this cooptation possible. Keeping their eye on the prize, their theories
and strategies emerge from efforts to attain freedom and equality now, and
in new and expansive ways.
330. See Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes
for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1553-54 (1991) (expressing concern that the
current conception of group autonomy does not, but ought to, provide that all persons are
empowered "to decide whether to remain on one side of a cultural boundary, to shift to another
side, or to seek a life not committed to one or the other community"); Donna J. Sullivan,
Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN Declaration on the Elimination of
Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 487, 488 (1988) (observing that the
notion of intolerance only applies between religious groups and not within them).
331. As West writes, "The major contribution religious revivals can make to left strategy is to
demand that Marxist thinkers and activists take seriously the culture of the oppressed." WEST,
supra note 112, at 378. West denounces the Left, which he claims has championed the cause of
oppressed peoples while having "little understanding and appreciation of the culture of these
people." Id. The Enlightenment legacy, he argues, led to the Left's "inability to believe in the
capacities of oppressed peoples to create cultural products of value." Id.
332. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997) ("Efforts to reform a status regime
bring about changes in its rule structure and justificatory rhetoric ....").
333. See id. ("The ways in which the legal system enforces social stratification are various
and evolve over time.").
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B. Operationalizing the New Enlightenment
As my grandmother, a physics professor in India, would quip, "In this
dynamic world, one cannot be static." Just as September 11 th forced us to
reconsider our old understandings of war, we should also reconsider the
legal tradition of religious sovereignty. Far from being obscurantist about
change, law must adapt so that the original goals of the Enlightenment may
prevail. Substantive cultural change will entail abandoning transition
narratives that posit the old Enlightenment as the end of history and the new
one as an anachronism.334 Today, individuals want rationality within
religious and cultural contexts. 35 In pursuing this right, they open up not
only new strategies for maintaining old rights, but entirely new ways of
imagining socially just futures, where democracy is both preferable and
possible in all aspects of our lives.
336
Thus far, I have argued that law has been complicit in thwarting the
New Enlightenment. In this final Section, I begin to address the next step:
What might law do instead? Ought law merely to do a better job of staying
out of internal religious conflict, thereby vowing to be no longer complicit
in the backlash projects of traditionalists and elites (i.e., let the market and
private coercion work things out)? Or should law try to adjudicate cultural
claims based on a different set of normative principles-namely, those of
the New Enlightenment rather than the old? I propose that law should
rethink its procedures and prescriptions in light of the New Enlightenment.
Thin rules-such as a right of exit or the right to freedom in the public
sphere-sufficed to fulfill Enlightenment goals, but today, individuals need
and demand more. I do not offer any simple legal rule in their place-such
as one that states that equality norms should trump religious liberty norms,
or a rule that would prohibit personal, customary, or religious law
altogether in favor of a uniform public legal system. Such rules are
334. As Kennedy explains, we have a problem when eighteenth-century notions of the world
prohibit us from seeing the new problems and solutions of the twenty-first century. He writes:
The movement's Western liberal origins become part of the problem.., when
particular difficulties general to the liberal tradition are carried over to the human rights
movement. When, for example, the global expression of emancipatory objectives in
human rights terms narrows humanity's appreciation of these objectives to the forms
they have taken in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western political tradition.
Kennedy, supra note 14, at 114.
335. See Rodney Stark, Rationality, in GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF RELIGION, supra note 112,
at 239,239-44 (advocating rationality within religious thought).
336. See 'ABDOLKARIM SOROUSH, Tolerance and Governance, A Discourse on Religion and
Democracy, in REASON, FREEDOM & DEMOCRACY IN ISLAM: ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF
'ABDOLKARIM SOROUSH 131, 135 (Mahmoud Sadri & Ahmad Sadri eds. & trans., 2000) (arguing
that democracy does not require traditional secularism, and explaining that "[tlhe practice that
truly violates democracy is not embracing a faith but the imposition of a particular belief or
punishment of disbelief' (emphasis added)). On contemporary intellectuals in the Muslim world-
from secular intellectuals to "modem Muslim activist" intellectuals-see JOHN L. ESPOSITO &
JOHN 0. VOLL, MAKERS OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAM (2001).
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themselves "thin" in that they fail to recognize a central claim of the New
Enlightenment-that women ought to be able to have equality even within
the context of religion or community.
Rather, I offer here a set of procedures and principles, fueled by the
larger vision of a New Enlightenment, that would allow law and legal
decisionmakers to operationalize this New Enlightenment.
1. Passive Proceduralism
This prescription would require legal decisionmakers (for example,
judges, national lawmakers, international human rights treaty-making
participants, and United Nations and regional human rights committees) to
recognize that religions are dynamic communities, whose norms are in a
state of constant negotiation-and that the law impedes this dynamism
(usually in favor of powerful members of the community) whenever it
imposes upon religious communities a static, top-down vision of what that
community is.3 37 In light of this reality, legal decisionmakers would cease
privileging the norms of religious elites and would instead place elites and
dissenters on an equal footing-but only when a specific dispute is brought
before a decisionmaker. This approach is procedural insofar as it requires
that all members of a community are represented before the courts,
legislatures, and human rights bodies. Merely acknowledging an internal
diversity of interests-when such diversity actually exists-may help
decisionmakers to become less complicit in backlash efforts on behalf of
the status quo. Furthermore, a finding of diverse claims about the meaning
of membership may ultimately lead decisionmakers to refuse to enforce
strict rights to exclude from the normative community based on claims of
inauthenticity, thus making the communities themselves more
accommodating of difference and pluralism.
Revisiting the cases in point that I highlighted in Section II.D may be
helpful in illustrating this approach. In each of those cases-women
protesting their countries' religious and culture-based reservations to
CEDAW, Muslim women seeking to reform personal laws in India,
religious women challenging sex discrimination in the United States, tribal
women striving for gender equality within the tribe in the United States,
and African women seeking reform of discriminatory customary laws-the
primary fault of legal decisionmakers at both the international and national
337. This is Robert Cover's argument. Cover recognized that law is more often jurispathic-
killing off the "law" offered by dissenters-than jurisgenerative. See Robert M. Cover, The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (1982)
(famously writing: "Judges are people of violence. Because of the violence they command, judges
characteristically do not create law, but kill it. Theirs is the jurispathic office. Confronting the
luxuriant growth of a hundred legal traditions, they assert that this one is law and destroy or try to
destroy the rest.").
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levels has been a failure to acknowledge the claims of dissenting women for
more equality within their religious and cultural group, and for a liberty
right to define the group's norms. In all of these cases, legal authorities
currently practice a policy of deference to religious leaders, who are given
absolute authority to define the norms of the group. In contrast, the passive
proceduralism I suggest here would require legal decisionmakers to
recognize multiple claims to define community. Passive proceduralism
would prevent law from being coopted by status quo interests, and would
allow for the proliferation of greater difference, equality, and liberty within
each group.
To be sure, this approach only facilitates the substantive goals of the
New Enlightenment-freedom and equality within normative
communities-to the extent that such claims are actually made before legal
decisionmakers. In many cases, communities may lack serious dissent; in
the next Subsection, I consider law's role in facilitating internal dissent and
individual capabilities for participating in the processes of cultural
meaning-making. But the question of how much dissent is necessary to
warrant legal recognition remains. Certainly, the extent of dissent within a
community will also turn on the opportunity for dissent. But assuming
ample opportunity to dissent, what is the procedural obligation to recognize
a small dissenting minority-say, two out of a hundred? Again, recognition
of even this small group of dissenters' claims would descriptively
acknowledge that the group is not, in fact, homogeneous. But recognition of
these dissenters' claims also implicates some of the more substantive goals
of the New Enlightenment-namely, that individuals have a right to dissent
and be different within normative spaces. Recognizing the existence of
difference-no matter how little-would make it more difficult to legally
impose conformity and repress autonomy.
As anemic as the passive proceduralist approach may seem on one
level, it acquires some vigor in that religious groups are increasingly
seeking refuge in the law from internal voices of modernization and dissent.
Today, we see cultural groups increasingly turning to law to help forcefully
preserve traditional communities. In the face of such preservationist
movements, the law should acknowledge the dynamic nature of religious
communities and block the efforts of religious elites who would lock in
their privileged status quo in the name of religious tradition. Yet the voice
of dissent would have to originate from within a religious community. In
these cases, law would merely recognize that dissent and would thereby
empower the subaltern to speak.
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2. Robust Proceduralism
The passive proceduralist approach merely asks lawmakers to respond
to claims brought before them. But this approach presumes that women and
other disempowered individuals within communities have the knowledge or
strength to question their leaders and to demand cultural change. In order to
empower the subaltern to speak, the state must take an affirmative role in
promoting discourse and in ensuring that women are given access to
educational and economic opportunities so that they will have the critical
tools to challenge received norms and to make the world their own. For
example, the state may encourage more networking efforts similar to those
pioneered by NGOs such as WLUML (by, for example, guaranteeing their
ability to operate without interference within its borders), and more on-the-
ground education, empowerment, and consciousness raising such as that
facilitated by human rights manuals like Claiming Our Rights. Or a state
may go as far as ensuring women equal access to educational and religious
institutions at all levels, and access to unregulated global media and
technologies, such as the Internet.33 At either end of the spectrum, this
approach, too, is procedural in that it requires law to empower previously
marginalized voices to participate in the processes of cultural meaning-
making. But it is more robust in that it envisions an affirmative role for the
state in shaping a more broadly educated and represented cultural citizenry.
Robust proceduralism would also require a state to protect cultural
dissenters from suppression, harassment, and violence. In this Article, I
have mostly spoken about cultural dissent as an unmitigated good; I have
tried to highlight the powerful, dissenting voices of Muslim women that
have too often been ignored. But my championing of such efforts is not
naive. On a daily basis, these women risk their lives in order to claim their
rights to religion and equality. To be sure, dissent is a very dangerous
proposition. Thus, any state that seeks to foster such dissent must
acknowledge the need to provide for legal mechanisms to protect women
and other dissenters against violent backlash. This protection would take
many forms. Just as in the United States where the First Amendment
recognizes the need to protect unpopular speakers from being silenced by
the state, states should also recognize free speech rights within private,
normative groups.33 9 Women dissenters, in particular, may be vulnerable to
suppression by more violent means, including sexual harassment and
338. See Madhavi Sunder, intellectual Property and Identity Politics: Playing with Fire, 4 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 69, 94 (2000) (arguing against national laws that would limit access to
global media and technology in order to promote cultural survival).
339. I make this argument elsewhere. See Sunder, supra note 33, at 562 (arguing for a "right
to speak and to challenge oppressive cultural norms and practices" from within a cultural
association).
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rape. 340 Indeed, women in all contexts, from social workers and human
rights agents to dissenting women in villages, are potential victims of
violence aimed at silencing their speech.34 1 Particularly where a state is
employing change-agents to pursue social and human rights reform, robust
proceduralism would require that the state take responsibility for punishing
those who use violence to suppress cultural dissent.342
3. Substantive Prescriptions
While the case of the small minority of dissenters begins to implicate
more substantive goals, the case of the "bad dissenters"-those dissenters
who seek more repression, not more freedom-presents even more difficult
issues. In this case, operationalizing the New Enlightenment requires
making substantive legal judgments. At the same time, these legal
judgments may be perfectly consistent with the types of legal judgments
required by the old Enlightenment. Recall that the traditional legal rule of
religious sovereignty is based on a normative vision outlined by the
Enlightenment-freedom in the public sphere is freedom itself. But I have
argued in this Article for a new normative vision emerging from the
groundwork of women's human rights activism. These activists herald a
more expansive understanding of freedom as requiring rights within public
and private spaces, namely within normative, religious, and cultural
communities. Thus, just as Enlightenment norms required legal
decisionmakers to reject legal claims to discriminate in the public sphere, so
too would New Enlightenment norms reject claims to discriminate in the
private sphere.
Some may read my Article as a call for an even more substantively
activist role for international law in which it intervenes directly in religious
communities to enforce norms of international human rights law. This
might mean, for example, compelling Islamic authorities to conform
Shari'a to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the Papacy to
340. I have written about a path-breaking sexual harassment case in India in which a state-
sponsored social worker was subjected to sexual harassment, culminating in a gang rape, in
response to her efforts to educate women and men in rural communities about the hazards of child
marriages. Her tragedy became a test case in India. Reformers sought legal recognition of sexual
harassment as an employment hazard, particularly for women working as change-agents. See
Madhavi Sunder, In a "Fragile Space": Sexual Harassment and the Construction of Indian
Feminism, 18 LAW & POL'Y 419, 425 (1996) (describing reformers' argument that sexual
harassment-including gang rape-is a tool for controlling and silencing "women engaged in the
delicate but real work of constructing national and gender identity").
341. See id. at 428-33 (highlighting interviews with women victims of sexual harassment
from all over India working in a variety of fields).
342. The Indian Supreme Court has held that states have such an obligation. See Vishaka v.
Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011 (outlining national guidelines for the protection of women
against workplace sexual harassment).
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conform its stance on abortion and birth control to the strictures of
CEDAW. But this would be taking my argument too far.
That said, I suspect that cultural dissent is more often the rule than the
exception-that is, that dissenting voices within cultures are omnipresent. I
am often asked, for example, whether the prescriptions I offer here would
require substantive intervention with respect to the Hmong immigrant
community in the United States, which has attained notoriety for its
ostensibly traditional practice of "marriage by capture" or "marriage by
abduction." 343 The questioners almost always presume that Hmong
immigrants uniformly accept and defend this practice. 344 But as Bill Ong
Hing has exposed through first-hand research among immigrant Hmong
youth, many Hmong-Americans dissent from such traditions. Indeed, Hing
finds his interviewees are committed to maintaining and fostering their
cultural identity, but are less than reverent about how they do so. They
"sense an obligation to learn about and perpetuate their culture [but] want to
do so on their own terms." 345 Similarly, returning to the case of Amina
Lawal, many within Nigeria contest the rise of strict, Shari'a law in that
country.
346
My point is that while questions about substantive intervention in cases
of no cultural dissent may be sound in theory, I do not think that they
represent a very common problem in fact.3 4 7 In most cases, individuals are
challenging oppressive cultural and religious norms and appealing to legal
authorities to hear their case. But legal authorities are rejecting their claims
at present, paradoxically protecting religious elites against rumblings for
change and modernity. In this sense, this Article agrees with scholars such
343. Deirdre Evans-Pritchard & Alison Dundes Renteln, The Interpretation and Distortion of
Culture: A Hmong "Marriage by Capture" Case in Fresno, California, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
1, 14 (1994) (describing such practices as involving a Hmong male's kidnapping of a woman
against her will, intending that she become his bride-where this custom is recognized, he will
obtain the sanction of both his and her family for their marriage at a later date).
344. Cf id. at 14-16 (describing this practice as only one among many marriage practices in
Hmong culture, with some allowing a woman much greater choice in the selection of a marriage
partner). Evans-Pritchard and Renteln critique the use of a "cultural defense" in such cases
because this approach all too often presents "a single uniform version of a marriage practice,"
despite contest within a culture ovei such practices. Id. at 21. The writers highlight that many
cases involved claims by Hmong women in the United States, including a prospective bride and
her mother, who appealed to American authorities not to recognize such marriages. Id. at 16.
345. Bill Ong Hing, Refugee Policy and Cultural Identity: In the Voice of Hmong and Iu
Mien Young Adults 48, 50 (Jan. 16, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(describing young Hmong women, in particular, as "embracing gender equality" in the self-
conscious process of forming their cultural identity).
346. See supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text; see also Janine di Giovanni, Divine
Injustice, TIMES (London), Nov. 30, 2002, at 24 (chronicling protests against Lawal's stoning
sentence by Nigerian feminist organization, Baobab).
347. In the rare case of no cultural dissent, I do not, at this time, propose further substantive
intervention on the basis of my theory. Indeed, such cases are beyond the scope of my proposals,
which are not intended to cover comprehensively each and every instance of injustice in the
private sphere.
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as Franck and Nussbaum that people, the world over, want freedom and
equality. I diverge from them in that I emphasize that, contrary to
traditional liberalism, women and men increasingly pursue such values
within private, cultural spaces as well as public ones. Today, the world's
women are reimagining traditional, liberal notions of freedom and equality
in thicker, richer ways. For law to leave them with the options of centuries
past elides their claims, and their important legal contributions. Instead, law
can and should operationalize the New Enlightenment they herald by
recognizing diverse ways of imagining socially just futures.
CONCLUSION
Just as the eighteenth-century public acquired its Enlightenment less
from philosophers than through the work of philosophes--'populizers'
such as "journalists, men of letters, the bright young talkers of the
salons"348 -the twenty-first century public is acquiring a New
Enlightenment from the real-world activists of the transnational human
rights movement. Forging ahead of both anthropological and lega! theorists,
the international human rights reformers working within a Muslim context
are challenging traditional understandings of both religion and international
law as imposed, and advocating instead a right to question, critique, and
indeed, recreate normative communities for themselves. Contrary to their
popular image as either slaves to tradition or naive champions of it,
reformers in Muslim communitics are doing thc hard work of rcimagining
the present and future. Yet, we are ignoring it.349 By continuing to read their
actions within a meta-narrative of transition, we reduce their agency to
mere mimicry of the West, or we write off their commitment to religion and
difference as a relic of the past. Having no context for conceiving the
presence of religion and equality, we discount as conservative or ignore
completely the radically new frameworks for human rights they are
building. In short, Muslim women are producing a new legal consciousness
but there is static on the receiving end.
348. See Crane Brinton, Enlightenment, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 519, 519
(Paul Edwards et al. eds., 1972). Crane Brinton is the former President of the American Historical
Association.
349. For example, in an editorial on the importance of internal dialogue within religious
communities, Thomas Friedman contended that while "Christianity and Judaism struggled with
this issue for centuries .. a similar internal struggle within Islam to re-examine its texts and
articulate a path for how one can accept pluralism and modernity-and still be a passionate,
devout Muslim-has not surfaced in any serious way." Thomas L. Friedman, Editorial, The Real
War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at A19. That same day, on the pages of Friedman's paper,
another writer argued that Afghan women "have already shown their determination to create
change from within," stressing that "Western organizations can be more effective in helping
women if they ground their support in the positions of Muslim feminists." Rina Amiri, Editorial,
Muslim Women as Symbols-and Pawns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at A19.
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In critiquing international law's transition narrative, I do not intend to
call for a return to the past of religious Empire. Rather, I call for
international law to think beyond the old Enlightenment to the new one. In
the twenty-first century, new theories and normative demands may better
guide our laws to guaranteeing more freedom, not less. The New
Enlightenment does not reject the old one, but rather takes it further,
350
demanding reason and rights within normative as well as secular
community. This requires piercing the veil that protects religious
authoritarianism from the processes of justice. For international law to be
truly modem, it must begin to confront its own traditions.
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350. In this sense I agree with Habermas that "the defects of the Enlightenment can only be
made good by further enlightenment." Thomas McCarthy, Introduction to HABERMAS, supra note
65, at vii, xvii.
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